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Abstract:
This paper investigates whether the arrival of managers with export expe-
rience, i.e. experience acquired through participation in the export activity
of previous employers, is related to ﬁrms’ international trade status and to
what extent this relationship is of a causal nature. We construct a worker-ﬁrm
matched panel dataset which enables us to track managers across different
ﬁrms over time and observe ﬁrms’ trading stance as well as a large set of
workers’ and ﬁrms’ characteristics. Contrary to blue and white collars, we
ﬁnd that managers are paid a sizeable premium for export experience which
has both a level and a trend component. Conditioning for the ﬁrm past trade
status, we ﬁnd that a one standard deviation increase in the ﬁrm’s share of
managers’ with export experience corresponds to about 35% more chances of
starting to export. The impact is stronger for larger ﬁrms and is roughly of
the same order of magnitude of the ﬁrm productivity effect. On the contrary,
export experience acquired by managers from previous employers positively
affects the capacity to keep exporting in small ﬁrms only. To give a causality
ﬂavor to our ﬁndings, we use in a ﬁnal step an IV strategy that mimics a
random matching between managers with export experience and ﬁrms. IV
estimations indicate that export experience matters even more for entry while
it has no effect on exit.
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There is a large body of literature, at the intersection of different ﬁelds, explicitly con-
cerned with managers. Among the wide range of topics covered, and of particular rele-
vance for our analysis, some of this literature is devoted to explaining the determinants of
their pay (Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Guadalupe and Wulf (2008)), while other frame-
works focus on the impact of managers on corporate decisions and ﬁrm performance
(Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Bloom and Van-Reenen (2010), and Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan,
McKenzie and Roberts (2010)), or on the interaction between globalization, technological
change, and managerial tasks and teams (Antràs, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006),
Blinder (2006), and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008)). The goal of our paper is
to contribute to this literature by analyzing, thanks to a unique dataset allowing us to
trace the universe of workers and their movements across exporting and non-exporting
ﬁrms, the contribution of managers’ previous export experience on both their pay and
the likelihood of ﬁrm entry/exit into the export activity.
The idea that managers matter for the export status of a ﬁrm is not new and has been
subject to several case-studies analyses in the Management literature. A substantial part
of this literature is focused on “early internationalizing ﬁrms” or “born global ﬁrms”,1 i.e.
ﬁrms who are involved in one or more types of overseas business relationships from the
very beginning of their life. Among these contributions, in their case study of Swedish
born global ﬁrms Andersson and Wictor (2003) argue:
“The entrepreneurs described in this study display some common traits but also some differ-
ences. The majority have an academic degree, one entrepreneur has also commenced doctoral
studies. However, one entrepreneur has no academic degree....Some of the entrepreneurs had
experience in the industry...., but others did not...The entrepreneurs are hard to characterize as a
single group....All entrepreneurs in this study had extensive international experience.”
International experience acquired in previous jobs seems thus to be key to understand
born global ﬁrms. In this paper, we use econometrics tools and take a broader perspective
considering all ﬁrms involved in export activities independently of their age. We are
particularly interested in understanding whether export experience, broadly deﬁned
as having previously worked for an exporting ﬁrm, matters for successfully starting
and/or continuing to export. Another way of reframing our research question is whether
workers acquire some valuable export-related knowledge by working in exporting ﬁrms
and are then able to successfully transfer some of this knowledge to new employing
ﬁrms.
1See, for example, Rialp, Rialp and Knight (2005) for a recent survey.
1The reader may have noticed the switch from managers to workers. Indeed, it is
not a priori clear whether only the knowledge eventually transferred by managers is
valuable and this issue will be an integral part of our analysis. The reasons why we
focus on the distinction between managers and non-managers are twofold. First, Blinder
(2006) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) suggest that the complexity of the
tasks involved in the different stages of the production process is key to understand
recent trends in international trade. At the same time, Antràs et al. (2006) explicitly
focus on teams of workers and their formation in a globalized economy and highlight
the key distinction between managers and non-managers based on tasks complexity.
Second, managers are also different from other workers because they are in charge of
marketing and commercialization activities (which are not necessarily more complex)
like, for example, setting-up distribution channels, ﬁnding and establishing relationships
with foreign suppliers, setting up marketing activities directed at ﬁnding and informing
new buyers, and building a customer base. Arkolakis (2007) and Eaton, Eslava, Kugler
and Tybout (2009) stress the role of search and marketing costs in international trade and
provide evidence of the importance of the continuous “search and learning about foreign
demand” problem that ﬁrms face when selling abroad.
Our paper is also related to the recent literature of the determinants of trade at the
ﬁrm level. Starting with the seminal paper by Melitz (2003), many models have been
building around a ‘darwinian’ selection mechanism of the most productive ﬁrms into
export. The recent availability of ﬁrm-level trade data has allowed to heavily improve our
understanding of the determinants of export status with data suggesting that exporting
ﬁrms are larger, have a more skilled workforce, do more R&D, and pay higher wages.
However, even considering all these different dimensions, there models are still far
from matching the degree of cross-sectional heterogeneity across ﬁrms in their export
participation and intensity. There are indeed many very productive ﬁrms that do not
export at all and quite a few very unproductive ﬁrms that do sell abroad. One possibility
is that ﬁrms face idiosyncratic barriers to enter foreign markets like in Eaton, Kortum
and Kramarz (2008). Though, the nature and size of such barriers is rather unclear. The
ample evidence that ﬁrms incur substantial sunk costs to entry export markets is in fact
in stark contrast with the ‘volatility’ of the export activity across time. There is indeed
a lot of entry and exit with, for example, the bulk of new exporters surviving only one
year (Eaton, Eslava, Kugler and Tybout (2008)). Moreover, ﬁrms seem to experiment
their products on one market and eventually expand in different markets (‘sequential
exporting’) like in Albornoz, Calvo-Pardo, Corcos and Ornelas (2010).
The above elements suggest that market information-related costs might play a key
role in determining export status and its dynamics. Managers are at the core of marketing
and commercialization activities within the ﬁrm and should thus be of primary interest
2in the quest for such market information-related costs. At the same time, however,
managers are different from other workers because of the complexity of the tasks they
perform which might ultimately affect ﬁrms’ competitiveness beyond what can be mea-
sured by productivity.
In order to explore these ideas, we construct a unique dataset for Portugal by merging
two sources. The ﬁrst one is Quadros de Pessoal, a matched employer-employee dataset
covering the entire population of workers and widely used in the labor literature. The
second is the universe of transaction-level ﬁrm-trade data coming from customs returns
forms (extra-EU trade) and Intrastat forms (intra-EU trade). The two datasets are merged
by means of the ﬁrm identiﬁer and provide us the means to draw a sharp portrait of the
workers’ (and especially managers’) export experience and its ﬂow across ﬁrms with
different trade status. This is possible thanks to two quite unique features of our data:
an exhaustive coverage and a high degree of reliability. These two key characteristics
allow us to follow workers and ﬁrms over time while being able to record workers’
accumulation of export experience and changes in ﬁrms’ export activity. Furthermore,
the richness of the data allow us to control for a wealth of both worker and ﬁrm
characteristics like (among others) job location, workers’ education and skills, and ﬁrms’
size, productivity and foreign ownership.
As a ﬁrst step in the quest of a causal relationship between the export experience
brought by managers into a ﬁrm and its trade status we assess whether such an experi-
ence is reﬂected into wages. To achieve this goal, we estimate a Mincerian wage equation
and test both whether there is evidence of an export experience premium and whether
such premium is characterized by a level and/or trend component. A related question
that we also address is whether export experience is valuable only when the worker is a
manager or rather if a premium exists also for non-managers.
Overall, we ﬁnd that the (for us) observable export experience corresponds to a
premium for managers’ wage only. Such premium is larger than the premium of being
a manager with respect to a white collar and has both a level and a trend component
that jointly lead to a whopping 15% premium over a 7 year interval. Contrary to what
implicitly assumed in Muendler and Molina (2009), our evidence thus suggests that it
is not the experience of all workers which is valuable to the export performance of a
ﬁrm but only the experience brought in by managers.2 Furthermore, our ﬁndings point
(in some cases) to the existence of a larger experience premium for managers in trade-
involved ﬁrms with respect to non-exporters which suggests that such an experience is
more valuable for the former.
2Our ﬁndings are also related to Balsvik (2010) who ﬁnds that movers from MNEs to non-MNEs receive
a wage premium compared to stayers in non-MNEs.
3In order to provide more direct evidence, we model a ﬁrm’s trade status and its
evolution over time as a function of a large battery of time-varying control as well as
of the share of current managers in the ﬁrm that have export experience. Moreover,
following Roberts and Tybout (1997), we condition for the ﬁrm past trade status, the
latter reﬂecting the option value of sunk entry costs. In the ﬁrst part of the analysis we
focus on export entry while in the subsequent analysis we turn to export exit.
Our estimations indicate that a one standard deviation increase in the ﬁrm’s share of
managers’ with export experience corresponds to about 35% more chances of starting to
export. The impact is particularly strong for larger ﬁrms and is roughly of the same order
of magnitude of the positive ﬁrm productivity effect. On the contrary, export experience
acquired by managers from previous employers affects the capacity to keep exporting
only in the case of small ﬁrms.
In order to give a causality ﬂavor to our ﬁndings and go beyond the correlation
ﬁndings of Muendler and Molina (2009), we use an IV strategy that mimics as much
as possible a random matching between managers with export experience and ﬁrms.
IV estimations indicate that export experience matters even more than before for entry.
The share of managers with export experience is the most important determinant of the
export entry process with a one standard deviation increase leading to more than double
the probability to start exporting. On the other hand, correcting for endogeneity leads
to the conclusion that export experience acquired by managers from previous employers
has no effect on the likelihood to successfully continue international business, i.e. internal
and external export experience are substitutes. IV results conﬁrm that export experience
is more valuable to entry for large ﬁrms while suggesting that the key year for managers’
arrival to matter is the year the ﬁrm starts or quits exporting.
The rest of the paper is organized in ﬁve additional Sections. Section 2 describes the
construction of the dataset used in estimations. In Section 3 we expand on the scope of
our research and provide deﬁnitions of our key variables and a ﬁrst glance to the data.
Section 4 develops a Mincerian wage analysis to test both whether there is evidence of an
export experience premium and whether such premium is related to the type of worker
(managers vs. non-managers). In Section 5 we explicitly model a ﬁrm’s trade status and
its evolution over time as a function of, among other, the share of current managers in
the ﬁrm that have export experience. In order to give a causality ﬂavor to our ﬁndings
we use an IV strategy that mimics as much as possible a random matching between
managers with export experience and ﬁrms. Section 6 concludes and provides directions
for further research. Additional details about the data and complementary Tables are
provided in the Data and Tables Appendix respectively.
42. Data
Our analysis relies on information resulting from the merge of two major datasets:
a panel dataset on trade at the ﬁrm-country-product level and a matched employer-
employee panel dataset. Trade data come from Statistics Portugal (INE - Instituto Nacional
de Estatística) while employer-employee data come from Quadros de Pessoal (henceforth,
QP), a dataset made available by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. In the
following, we provide details of the two datasets and the sample resulting from the
merge.
2.1 Trade Data
Statistics Portugal collects data on export and import transactions by ﬁrms that are
located in Portugal on a monthly basis. These data comes from customs return forms in
the case of extra-EU trade and from a special form supplied to the Portuguese statistics
agency in the case of intra-EU trade (Intrastat). The same information is used for ofﬁcial
statistics and, besides small adjustments, the merchandise trade transactions in our
dataset aggregate to the ofﬁcial total exports and imports of Portugal. Each transac-
tion record includes, among others, the ﬁrm’s tax identiﬁer, an eight-digit Combined
Nomenclature product code, the destination/origin country, the value of the transaction
in euros, the quantity (in kilos and, in some case, additional product-speciﬁc measuring
units) of transacted goods, and the relevant international commercial term (FOB, CIF,
FAS,...etc.).3 We were able to gain access to data from 1995 to 2005 for the purpose of this
research. We use data on export transactions only, aggregated at the ﬁrm-year level.
2.2 Matched Employer-employee Data
The second main data source, Quadros de Pessoal, is a longitudinal dataset matching all
ﬁrms and workers based in Portugal.4 As for the trade data, we were able to gain access
3In the case of intra-EU trade, ﬁrms have the option of “adding up” multiple transactions only when
they refer to the same month, product, destination/origin country, Portuguese region and port/airport
where the transaction originates/starts, international commercial term, type of transaction (sale, re-
sale,...etc.), and transportation mode. In the case of intra-EU trade, ﬁrms are required to provide informa-
tion on their trade transactions if the volume of exports or imports in the current year or in the previous
year or two years before was higher than 60,000 euros and 85,000 euros respectively. More information can
be found at: http://webinq.ine.pt/public/files/inqueritos/pubintrastat.aspx?Id=168.
4Quadros de Pessoal has been used by, amongst others, Cabral and Mata (2003) to study the evolution
of the ﬁrm size distribution; by Blanchard and Portugal (2001) to compare the U.S. and Portuguese labor
markets in terms of unemployment duration and worker ﬂows; by Cardoso and Portugal (2005) to study
the determinants of both the contractual wage and the wage cushion (difference between contractual and
actual wages); by Martins (2009) to study the effect of employment protection on worker ﬂows and ﬁrm
performance. See these papers also for a description of the peculiar features of the Portuguese labor
market.
5to information from 1995 to 2005. Information for the year 2001 is only partly available
due to issues arisen in the collection of the data. In the next Section we provide details
on how we deal with this missing data problem for some key variables of our analysis.
The data are made available by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, drawing on
a compulsory annual census of all ﬁrms in Portugal that employ at least one worker.
Each year every ﬁrm with wage earners is legally obliged to ﬁll in a standardized
questionnaire. Reported data cover the ﬁrm itself, each of its plants, and each of its
workers. The variables available in the dataset include the ﬁrm’s location, industry, total
employment, sales, ownership structure (equity breakdown among domestic private,
public or foreign), and legal setting. The worker-level data cover information on all
personnel working for the reporting ﬁrms in a reference month (October). They include
information on gender, age, occupation, schooling, hiring date, earnings, hours worked
(normal and overtime), etc. The information on earnings is very detailed. It includes the
base wage (gross pay for normal hours of work), seniority payments, regular beneﬁts,
irregular beneﬁts and overtime pay.
Each ﬁrm entering the database is assigned a unique, time-invariant identifying
number which we use to follow ﬁrms over time. The Ministry of Labor and Social
Security implements several checks to ensure that a ﬁrm that has already reported to the
database is not assigned a different identiﬁcation number. Similarly, each worker also
has a unique identiﬁer, based on the worker’s social security number, which allows us
to follow individuals over time. The administrative nature of the data and their public
availability at the workplace - as required by the law - imply a high degree of coverage
and reliability. The public availability requirement facilitates the work of the services
of the Ministry of Employment that monitor the compliance of ﬁrms with the law (e.g.,
illegal work).
2.3 Combined dataset
The two datasets are merged by means of the ﬁrm identiﬁer. As in Cardoso and Portugal
(2005), we account for sectoral and geographical speciﬁcities of Portugal by restricting
the sample to include only ﬁrms based in continental Portugal while excluding Nace
rev.1 2-digit industries 1, 2, and 5 (agriculture and ﬁshery) as well as 95, 96, 97, and 99
(minor service activities and extra-territorial activities). Turning to workers, we consider
only single-job full-time workers aged between 16 and 65 and working a minimum of 25
and a maximum of 80 hours (base plus overtime) per week. The hourly wage in euros is
based on the total number of hours worked (normal plus overtime) and is constructed as
the sum of the base wage plus overtime wages and regular beneﬁts. In order to control
6for outliers, we apply a trimming based on the hourly wage and eliminate 0.5% of the
observations on both extremes of the distribution.
In what follows we focus on manufacturing ﬁrms only (Nace codes 15 to 37) because
of the closer relationship between the export of goods (that is key in our analysis) and the
production activity of the ﬁrm.5 Furthermore, being "managers" the job category we are
particularly interested in, we focus our analysis on the subset of ﬁrms with at least one
employed manager. The majority of ﬁrms in our data do not have an (employed) manager
(64.2%). Indeed, to identify managers we need the person(s) running the ﬁrm to be paid
a wage. For example, a ﬁrm owner running a ﬁrm as a self-employed will be picked up
in our data because a wage, along with an individual identiﬁer, is reported in the QP.
This is also the case whenever the person running the ﬁrm is a third person employed
by the owners(s). However, if there is no third person(s) and none of the owners is
self-employed we won‘t be able to attribute managers to the ﬁrm. Our analysis is thus
representative of larger and more organizationally structured ﬁrms that are indeed those
accounting for the bulk of trade in Portugal. Indeed, ﬁrms with at least one manager
represent (in 2004) 73.3% of exporting ﬁrms and account for 99.9% of Portuguese exports
in the manufacturing industry and for 98.8% of employment.
Insert Table 1 about here.
In our study we perform two complementary analyses. In section 4 we estimate a wage
equation in order to identify the existence of a premium for workers’ export experience
whose deﬁnition, along with those of ﬁrm trade status, occupational categories and
displaced workers, is provided in Section 3.1. In Section 5 we investigate the link between
managers, export experience, and ﬁrm trade status by performing both simple and IV
estimations. Because of the requirements imposed by our deﬁnitions, both analyses have
been performed over the period 1997-2004. The top (bottom) panel of Table 1 reports
summary statistics – for the year 2004 – of worker-level (ﬁrm-level) variables used in
our estimations and referring to observations for which all covariates – except in the
IV case – are jointly available. The top panel of Table 1 indicates, among other, that
in 2004 there are 386,062 workers in our sample with an average (log) hourly wage
of 1.373 euros, an average age of 38.4 years, an average education of 7.4 years, and
an average ﬁrm tenure of 10.6 years.6 The bottom panel of Table 1 tells us, among
other information, that these workers are employed by 12,342 ﬁrms and reports the
trade status, average (log) size and apparent labor productivity across ﬁrms, as well
5As explained below, even though our analysis focuses on manufacturing ﬁrms we use data both on
manufacturing and non-manufacturing ﬁrms to build some of our key variables. Moreover, we also carried
out a complete analysis for non-manufacturing ﬁrms. Results are available upon request.
6Worker tenure, wage and the identiﬁcation of the hiring date are deﬁned and described at length in
the Data Appendix. We thank Anabela Carneiro for providing the conversion table between education
categories (as deﬁned in QP) and number of years of schooling for every year of the data.
7as their (log) age, the share of foreign-owned ﬁrms (4.9%), and the mean and standard
deviation of managers’ age and education within the ﬁrm.7 Finally, the variable “Exports
PT”, obtained aggregating HS6 codes export data from the BACI dataset provided by
CEPII (Centre d’Etude Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales), represents (log)
aggregate exports of Portugal of products belonging to Nace rev.1 2-digit industries.
We provide in the next Section the deﬁnition of the key variables of our analysis while
expanding on the scope of our research. We further give a ﬁrst glance on the existence
of a wage premium for managers with export experience, the impact of managers with
export experience on ﬁrms’ trade status, and statistics on the distributions of experienced
managers across ﬁrms.
3. Managers, export experience, trade status, and displacement
3.1 Key deﬁnitions and scope of the research question
Managers
Throughout our analysis we distinguish between managers and non-managers. Con-
ceptually, we want to identify a group of workers (managers) that is responsible for the
main strategic decisions taken within the ﬁrm. Managers are responsible for high-level
tasks including the organization of the ﬁrm, strategic planning, the shaping of technical,
scientiﬁc and administrative methods or processes and the orientation of teams.8 In
practical terms, we refer to a classiﬁcation of workers according to eight hierarchical
levels deﬁned by the Portuguese law.9 The classiﬁcation is made according to the
task performed and skill requirements and each level can be considered as a layer in
a hierarchy deﬁned in terms of increasing responsibility and task complexity. Each ﬁrm
is required to classify workers according to these grade levels. Table 8 in the Tables
Appendix supplies a full description of the hierarchical levels. We deﬁne a manager as a
worker belonging to one of the top three hierarchical levels: “Top management", "Middle
management" or "Supervisors, and team leaders". Moreover, we deﬁne as white collar
a worker belonging to the fourth hierarchical level ("Higher-skilled professionals"), as
blue collar a worker belonging to the ﬁfth ("Skilled professionals"), sixth ("Semi-skilled
7Firm age, size, apparent labor productivity and foreign-ownership are deﬁned and described at length
in the Data Appendix.
8Bertrand and Schoar (2003) investigate whether individual managers affect corporate behavior. Even
though they cannot claim causality, they do ﬁnd systematic behavioral differences in corporate decision-
making across managers. Bloom and Van-Reenen (2010) claim that differences in productivity across
countries and ﬁrms largely reﬂect variations in management practices.
9See the Decreto Lei 121/78 of July 2nd.
8professionals") or seventh ("Non-skilled professionals") hierarchical level and as other
collar apprentices and other workers.
The reasons why we focus on the distinction between managers and non-managers
are twofold. First, there is a growing literature looking at the relationship between trade
and tasks. Blinder (2006) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) suggest that the
complexity of the tasks involved in the different stages of the whole production process
(design, manufacturing of parts, assembly, R&D, marketing, commercialization, etc.) is
key to understand recent trends in international trade and in particular outsourcing.
At the same time, Antràs et al. (2006) explicitly focus on teams of workers and their
formation in a globalized economy and highlight the key distinction between managers
and non-managers based on tasks complexity. Managers are different from other workers
and likely to be particularly important for trade activity because they are responsible for
the most complex tasks within a ﬁrm.
Second, managers are also different from other workers because they are in charge
of marketing and commercialization activities (which are not necessarily more complex)
like, for example, setting-up distribution channels, ﬁnding and establishing relationships
with foreign suppliers, setting up marketing activities directed at ﬁnding and informing
new buyers, and building a customer base. Arkolakis (2007) and Eaton et al. (2009) stress
the role of search and marketing costs in international trade and provide evidence of the
importance of the continuous “search and learning about foreign demand” problem that
ﬁrms face when selling abroad. At the same time, Araujo, Mion and Ornelas (2010) show
the importance of trust-building in repeated interactions between sellers and buyers in
an international market.
It is certainly difﬁcult to draw a straight line between these two dimensions under
which managers are different from other workers. Indeed, researching the foreign
regulatory environment and adapting the product to make sure that it conforms to
foreign standards (which includes testing, packaging, and labeling requirements) is a
commercialization activity that involves complex tasks. In a similar vein, making sure
the product meets the right quality standards for the targeted foreign demand which is,
as showed in Verhoogen (2008) and Iacovone and Javorcik (2009), a key element of inter-
national success is an example of an activity characterized by both a strong commercial
nature and tasks complexity. It is beyond the scope of our research to disentangle these
two facets and in what follows we will have both of them in the background.
In the second and ﬁfth columns of Table 2 we report the number of, respectively,
workers and managers for each year of the estimation sample (1997 to 2004). The ratio of
managers to workers increases over time as a consequence of the decline of production
jobs and, based on our classiﬁcation, managers roughly represent in-between 10 and 15%
of workers in manufacturing ﬁrms. Such share is larger than the one reported in other
9studies on managers like, for example, Iranzo, Schivardi and Tosetti (2008) with the key
reason being that we use a looser deﬁnition of managers. Like any dividing line, our
deﬁnition is certainly prone to questioning. Nevertheless, we believe that the boundaries
we set are more appropriate to the issues we focus in this study and that, in the end, what
is a good deﬁnition is (often) an empirical question. In this respect, we will show later on
that our loose deﬁnition of managers will indeed be empirically successful in drawing a
strong dividing line with respect to other workers. Furthermore if, for example, only top
management matters our results can still be interpreted as providing a lower bound of
the effect of managers.
Insert Table 2 about here.
Export experience
Having good reasons to believe that managers are special when it comes to trading on
foreign markets does not mean that managers are all alike. Arguably, the knowledge and
skills of a manager (and workers in general) cannot be considered as purely ﬁxed but
evolve over time depending on the different situations faced along a career. In particular,
some managers have had the chance to be involved in export activities in the past.
Likely, experience acquired yesterday improves the capacity of a manager to deal with
the complex tasks required in exporting and develop business networks today. Therefore,
all other things being equal, managers with export experience will be more valuable than
others for trading activities. To the extent that such knowledge is worker-speciﬁc and is
transferable from one ﬁrm to the other, it thus represents a valuable asset for the manager
(when changing employer and/or renegotiating the wage) and will affect the export
performances of the current employer. In our analysis, we are particularly interested in
capturing the ﬂow of such export experience across ﬁrms via the mobility of managers
and, more precisely, we want to identify the signiﬁcance and magnitude of this channel
on managers’ wage and ﬁrms’ trade status change. Firms’ trading status, managers,
wages, and mobility are therefore, for our purposes, four crucial interconnected aspects
of the data.
Exploiting the matched employer-employee feature of our dataset, we are able to track
workers over time. This allows us to identify, for each ﬁrm-year pair, the subset of
currently employed workers that have previously worked in a different ﬁrm. Moreover,
exploiting the trade dataset, we can single-out those workers that were employed in the
past by an exporting ﬁrm. We deﬁne the latter group as “workers with export experience
acquired outside the ﬁrm”. In the remaining of the paper, we will refer to them simply
as “workers with export experience” and, since we are able to track all workers, we
consider both managers and non-managers with export experience and assess whether
export experience matters for managers only or both. Columns 3 and 6 of Table 2 report
10the number of, respectively, workers and managers with export experience for each year
of the estimation sample. As one can see, numbers are increasing over time due to the
fact that: (i) we cannot identify the export status of previous employers before 1995; (ii)
as workers move across ﬁrms during the 1997-2004 estimation period, more and more
workers acquire export experience. On the one hand, this feature of the data exposes
us to measurement error meaning that we fail to identify, especially in early years, some
worker as having export experience. However, this should not be much of a concern
in our analysis as the type of measurement error we face should provide us with a
lower bound of the value of export experience for the worker (Section 4) and should not
systematically affect our comparison of ﬁrms with different trade status (Section 5). On
the other hand, the value of export experience is likely to be characterized by a time
decay. The fact that we only consider export experience related to export activity carried
in between 1995 and 2005 avoid us to classify a worker as having export experience
because of a very distant job in the past.
Parallel to the case of managers, our deﬁnition of export experience can be debated.
Pushing the time decay argument further, one can think of reﬁning our deﬁnition by
imposing that the previous job in an exporting ﬁrm must be recent enough. In the same
vein, one can argue that experience acquired in a ﬁrm exporting a lot (for example at
least 500,000 euros) can be more valuable. Last but not least, the number of years a
worker spent in a previous exporting employer can be relevant as well. In unreported
estimations, we actually experimented with all three reﬁnements ﬁnding very similar
results with respect to our basic deﬁnition of export experience. Though surprising at
ﬁrst sight, we did not ﬁnd strong evidence that, for example, export experience acquired
in a large exporter matters more. At second sight, however, this can be quite easily
rationalized. A large exporting ﬁrm has typically several managers meaning that each of
them is actually exposed only to a “fraction” of the tasks and network activities involved
in the trade business. Indeed, we only ﬁnd that reﬁning export experience by imposing a
constraint on the number of years a worker spent in a previous exporting ﬁrm provides
stronger results. However, the magnitude of the difference is quite small. All in all, these
ﬁndings make us believe that our loose deﬁnition of export experience is enough to get
the big picture of a phenomenon that, if more tightly measured, would provide even
stronger results.
Finally, it is important to stress that we focus here on one out of many possible
channels of export-related knowledge transmission and that a distinction should be
made between internal and external export experience. From the perspective of a ﬁrm
wanting to enter the export market for the ﬁrst time, export-related knowledge can only
be acquired from sources outside the ﬁrm as there is no in-house experience. In this
light, our analysis looks at the effect of export experience brought into a ﬁrm by newly
11hired workers on the likelihood to become an exporter. Though arguably important,
other channels are certainly at work. For example, export-related knowledge can also be
developed via training programs aimed at increasing managers’ knowledge and links to
foreign markets. Other information sources, like partnership and/or business projects
between exporting and non exporting ﬁrms, can also drastically impact the capacity of
a ﬁrm to engage in international trade.10 On the other hand, from the perspective of
a ﬁrm which is already exporting, there is already some available export experience
within the ﬁrm. In this perspective, our analysis can also shed light on the substituabil-
ity/complementarity between external and internal sources of export experience.
Trade status
In order to distinguish among ﬁrms that start and quit exporting we consider several
ﬁrm trade status categories. Partly following Eaton, Eslava, Kugler and Tybout (2008), we
divide ﬁrms into ﬁve categories on the basis of their (temporal) degree of involvement
in export markets. Each ﬁrm is classiﬁed, at any point in time, as a "New exporter",
"Continuing exporter", "Exiting exporter", "Never exporter" or "Other exporter". The
classiﬁcation is exhaustive and is based upon the behavior of the ﬁrm in a time span
of four years. Speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm in year t is classiﬁed as a (i) "New exporter" if the
ﬁrm exports both in t and in t + 1 but was not exporting in the two preceding years
(t   1 and t   2); (ii) "Continuing exporter" if the ﬁrm exports continuously from t   2
to t + 1; (iii) "Exiting exporter" if the ﬁrm was exporting in t   2 and t   1 but does not
export in the following two years (t and t + 1); (iv) "Never exporter" if the ﬁrm never
exports from t   2 to t + 1; (v) "Other exporter" if the ﬁrm does not belong to any of
the previous categories. The top panel of Table 3 reports the number of ﬁrms classiﬁed
by trade status for each year in the sample. In Section 5, we study the relationship
between managers with export experience and ﬁrms’ trade status change by focusing
on two comparisons: New exporters vs. Never exporters and Exiting exporters vs.
Continuing exporters. The idea behind this strategy is to compare, at each point in
time t, ﬁrms with the same (two years-long) exporting history but that “suddenly” take
divergent paths. Considering those ﬁrms that were not exporting both in t   2 and in
t   1, we are interested in understanding if and how much experienced managers affect
entry into the export activity. On the other hand, when comparing ﬁrms that were
exporting both in t 2 and in t 1, we are interested in understanding if and how much
experienced managers affect the capacity of the ﬁrm to keep exporting. In both cases,
we are interested in an "informed/successful/structured" decision to export as opposed
to a "random/occasional" presence in export markets and this is the reason why we
10However, the evidence provided in Bernard and Jensen (2004) suggests that the impact of export
promotions programs and industry/geographical informational spillovers among exporters is rather weak.
12use two year continuous (non-)export intervals to construct our trade status categories.11
Our key variable is the (within ﬁrm) share of managers employed in t who have export
experience. The bottom panel of Table 3 reports the average value (across ﬁrms) of this
share by trade status-year.
Insert Table 3 about here.
Displacement
In the last part of Section 5 we reﬁne the trade status analysis by using an IV
strategy. In order to mimic a random matching of managers and ﬁrms, we draw on
some exogenous variation in managers’ demand and supply and instrument the share
of managers with export experience. On the demand side, we use the ratio of managers
to workers within the ﬁrm in year t   3 as a predictor of subsequent hiring by a given
ﬁrm. Indeed, there is a positive correlation in the data between this ratio and ﬁrm hiring
in-between t   2 and t. Being a substantial part of managers with export experience in t
arrived within the last two years (about 42%, see Table 1), this instrument is ultimately
correlated with the share of experienced managers and, following Roberts and Tybout
(1997), 3 years can be considered a sufﬁciently long time span for the past not to matter
for export status.
On the manager supply side, we consider the local availability (within a NUTS 3
region) of managers that change ﬁrm because of displacement and we focus in particular
on ﬁrm closure.12 As outlined in Dustmann and Meghir (2005), a ﬁrm closure can be
thought to be an exogenous shock to a worker’s career, since it results in a separation
of all plant’s workers and it is not related to the worker’s own job performance. Fur-
thermore, for a variety of reasons that can be considered as exogenous in our analysis,
workers tend to search and accept more easily new jobs in the same location of the past
job. Combining these two arguments, the local availability of displaced managers with
export experience can be considered as an exogenous labor supply for local ﬁrms.
In order to classify workers as “displaced” we partly follow Carneiro and Portugal
(2006) and proceed in three steps. First we identify ﬁrms’ closures between 1995 and
2003. We deﬁne a ﬁrm as shutting down in year t when the ﬁrm is observed in the
QP data in year t but is not observed in the dataset in any of the three subsequent
11A number of recent papers (e.g. Eaton, Eslava, Kugler and Tybout (2008) for Colombian ﬁrms, Amador
and Opromolla (2008) for Portuguese ﬁrms, and Albornoz et al. (2010) for Argentinean ﬁrms) has unveiled
quite a few randomness showing that (i) many exporters are single-year, i.e. they export only for a year (or
less), (ii) their average export sales are extremely below average, and (iii) their average export sales grow
rapidly, conditional on survival. In our data single-year exporters are classiﬁed as "Other exporters".
12Displacement is usually deﬁned as the permanent and involuntary separation of workers from their
jobs without cause (i.e. for economic reasons). Displacement occurs when a ﬁrm shuts down or substan-
tially downsizes.
13years.13 Second, we identify those workers that used to be employed in the past by a
ﬁrm shutting down in t and that stayed in the closing ﬁrm till either t or t   1. In order
to distinguish workers’ mobility due to ﬁrms’ closures from mobility due to mergers &
acquisitions we use the hiring date of the worker in the current ﬁrm. In particular, we
require the worker hiring year in the current ﬁrm not to be smaller than the closure year
of the previous ﬁrm.14 Finally, to make our argument stronger, we consider for this set of
workers only those observations pertaining to their ﬁrst job after displacement because
subsequent employer changes are likely to be endogenous to both worker and employer
characteristics. Columns 4 and 8 of Table 2 report (respectively) the number of displaced
workers and managers with export experience for each year of the sample. Due to our
ﬁrm closure deﬁnition, in 2004 there are no displaced workers/managers.
Key features of our data
All in all, the QP and trade datasets provide us the means to draw a sharp portrait of
the workers’ (and especially managers’) export experience and its ﬂow across ﬁrms with
different trade status. This is possible thanks to two quite unique features of our data:
an exhaustive coverage and a high degree of reliability. These two key characteristics
allow us to follow workers and ﬁrms over time while being able to record workers’
accumulation of export experience and changes in ﬁrms’ export activity. Furthermore,
the richness of the data allow us to control for a wealth of both worker and ﬁrm charac-
teristics like (among others) job location, workers’ education and skills, and ﬁrms’ size,
productivity and foreign ownership. Last but not least, the capacity to precisely identify
ﬁrms’ closures and job displacement enriches our investigation with a key element to
assess a causal relationship.
3.2 A ﬁrst glance at the data
Wages and export experience premium
There is a large body of literature concerned with the existence and the explanation
of a wage premium for workers of exporting (as opposed to non-exporting) ﬁrms.15 As
shown in Martins and Opromolla (2009), Portugal is not an exception to this robust
13This time span should be sufﬁciently long to avoid measurement errors due to “temporary exits”,
with the most likely reason for such exits being that the survey form was not received by the Ministry of
Employment before the date when the recording operations were closed. See Carneiro and Portugal (2006)
for further details.
14The reason is that, in the case of mergers & acquisitions, the hiring year of workers who stayed in the
new ﬁrm is likely to be the hiring year corresponding to the pre-merger/pre-acquisition situation.
15See Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2007), Munch and Skaksen (2008), and Frias, Kaplanz and Ver-
hoogen (2009) among others.
14empirical ﬁnding. What Figures 1 and 2 add to this debate is that the wage premium
seems to come essentially from managers. Figure 1 shows the kernel density of the log
hourly wage distribution in our 2004 sample for non-managers broken down by ﬁrm
export status.16 The densities of export-involved ﬁrms (New, Exiting, and Continuing
exporters), when compared to the density of Never exporters, indicate somewhat higher
wages but magnitudes look pretty small. Differences become much clearer in Figure
2 when the same descriptive exercise is applied to managers‘ wage densities. Export-
involved ﬁrms seem to consistently pay managers more. The evidence is particularly
strong for Exiting exporters in the middle-top of the distribution, while for Continuing
and New exporters the difference is more pronounced when considering top wages.
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here.
Such purely descriptive result certainly needs econometric testing and controls for
both workers and ﬁrms characteristics. However, to the extent that the size of the
premium conveys information about the value of a worker for a ﬁrm, Figures 1 and
2 indicate that managers are relatively more valuable for export-involved ﬁrms. This
is consistent with our idea that those workers (managers) involved in high-level tasks
(like organization, strategic planning, and team orientation) as well as in marketing and
commercialization activities are of particular value when the dividing line across ﬁrms
is the export activity.
Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here.
A further step, which is more closely related to our research question, is to ask whether
managers’ export experience pays, i.e. if there exists a premium for the export experience
of a manager. Figures 3 provides a descriptive answer to such a question while Section 4
delivers a more solid econometric answer building on a Mincerian wage regression. The
top-left panel of Figure 3 shows the kernel density of the log hourly wage distribution, in
our 2004 sample, for managers with and without export experience referring to the group
of Never exporters. Interestingly enough, managers with export experience seem to gain
higher wages than managers without such experience in Never exporting ﬁrms. This
ﬁnding is consistent with either managers’ export experience being correlated with some
valuable (for both trading and non-trading ﬁrms) characteristics or with a compensating
differential story. The remaining panels of Figure 3 display the same kernel distribution
in the three other ﬁrm groups: New, Continuing, and Exiting exporters. It is pretty
clear from the Figure that in all cases higher wages are paid to managers with export
experience thus suggesting that also export-involved ﬁrms value export experience. What
is not clear from Figure 3 is whether the export experience premium paid by trade-
16The density referring to the group Other exporters is not reported in order to make the picture more
readable.
15involved ﬁrms is higher than that paid by Never exporters. We leave the answer to this
question for Section 4.
Another intriguing issue in our analysis is whether the export experience premium
we observe confounds ﬁrm change patterns in managers’ wage proﬁles. Indeed, in order
to gain export experience, our deﬁnition requires a worker to change employer. Workers
with export experience are thus a sub-sample of those workers changing employer at
least once in our sample. In order to gain some preliminary insights on this issue,
Figure 4 provides a graphical overview of a simple difference-in-difference exercise. For
simplicity, we consider here (unlike in the wage regression analysis of Section 4) only
those workers that change ﬁrm only once in the 1997-2004 period and are managers in the
new ﬁrm. The treated group is represented by managers moving to another ﬁrm while
contemporaneously gaining export experience in t 2 [1997,2004]. The control group is
represented by managers moving to another ﬁrm in t but not gaining export experience
because the former employer was not an exporter. Figure 4 provides the average log
wage of both the treated and control group (left axis), as well as their difference (right
axis), in between t   3 and t + 2. This simple exercise reveals that managers acquiring
export experience at some date t were, on average, previously gaining a higher wage that
those that simply change employer. However, the difference between the wage of the
treated and control group was steadily shrinking before t. Suddenly, at the time of the
employer change t, there is a break in the pattern of the wage difference that continues
also in t + 1, and slows down in t + 2. Besides showing that the acquisition of export
experience is more than simply changing employer, Figure 4 suggests that the export
experience premium has both a level and trend component. We will come back to this
issue more in detail in Section 4.
Export experience and trade status
Insert Figures 5 and 6 about here.
In Section 5 we complement our wage analysis by looking at ﬁrms’ trade performance
and its link to the presence of managers with export experience. Among the different
ﬁrm trade performance margins, we focus on trade status and consider as key variable
the (within the ﬁrm) share of managers employed in t who have export experience. The
bottom panel of Table 3 reports the average value of this share by trade status-year. In
order to shed light on the impact of managers’ export experience on the entry into export
activity, we will be comparing in Section 5 two sets of ﬁrms that have in common the fact
of not having exported in both t   1 and t   2 but that, suddenly, take diverging paths
from t onwards: New exporters who exports in both t and t + 1 and Never exporters
who keep selling only domestically. Table 3 reveals that, in each year of our sample,
the share of managers with export experience is higher in New than in Never exporters
16with the ratio of the two shares being around three. Figure 5 provides further insights
on this difference by looking at it evolution around the key date t with levels of the
two shares being reported on the left axis and the difference being reported on the right
axis. Considering our working window of 4 years, one can appreciate that the share
of managers with export experience is higher in New as compared to Never exporters
already in t   2. However, the difference increases reaching its peak in t when New
exporters start exporting.
Clearly, this represents only descriptive evidence and can simply be considered as a
necessary (but not sufﬁcient) condition on the data to be consistent with a causal impact
of managers’ export experience on starting to export. In particular, the fact that the share
is higher in New exporters already in t-2 calls for the introduction of additional covariates
to help conditioning for differences between New and Never exporters. Furthermore, the
direction of casuality between the increase in the share of managers between t   2 and
t and the entry into export activity by New exporters is certainly an issue and calls for
some source of exogenous variation in the data to provide identiﬁcation. We address
both concerns in Section 5.
Parallel to the previous comparison, in Section 5 we will be contrasting ﬁrms that
have in common the same successful export activity in the two previous years but that,
starting from t, take diverging paths: Continuing exporters who keep exporting in both
t and t + 1 and Exit exporters who do not to export in these two years. A quick look at
Table 3 reveals that the share of managers with export experience might indeed play a
role in the export exit process. In each year of our sample, the share of managers with
export experience is higher in Continuing than in Exit exporters with the ratio of the two
shares being around 1.3. However, Figure 6 shows that the situation is much less clear
than in the previous case.
By looking at levels of the two shares (left axis) and their difference (right axis) one can
appreciate that Exiting ﬁrms start with a lower share in t   2. However, the difference
shrinks in t   1 while increasing in the dividing year t and changing actually sign in
t + 1. Econometric tools will be used in Section 5 to gain a better understanding of this
comparison.
4. Wage analysis
A ﬁrst step in the quest of a causal relationship between the export experience brought by
managers into a ﬁrm and its trade performance is to assess whether such an experience
is valued on the labor market. A positive ﬁnding can, though other explanations would
still be plausible, be interpreted as a consequence of a causal relationship.
17To achieve this goal, we estimate a Mincerian wage equation and test both whether
there is evidence of an export experience premium and whether such premium arises in
the ﬁrst year a manager joins the new ﬁrm and/or accrues with time. Furthermore, we
explore whether the export experience premium is related to the degree of involvement
of a ﬁrm into the export activity. Arguably, the premium should reﬂect the expected
increase in the stream of proﬁts induced by the managers having export experience and
therefore vary according to the degree of export participation and/or ambitions of a ﬁrm.
A related question that we also address is whether export experience is valuable only
when the worker is a manager or rather if a premium exists also for non-managers.
The existence of a premium for non-managers would be, for example, consistent with
the presence of some sort of knowledge valuable to the exporting activity brought into
the ﬁrm by blue and/or white collars. The existence of a premium for managers only
would instead be in line with our idea that managers are special when it comes down
to exporting because of both the complexity of the tasks involved in their job and the
special nature of some of the activities (like marketing and commercialization) they are
responsible for.
4.1 Econometric model
We index workers by i, ﬁrms by f, and time by t. Each worker i is associated at time t to
a unique ﬁrm. The baseline wage regression we estimate is given by:
wit =  + 1Ageit + 2Age2
it + 3Eduit + 4Tenit + 5Managit + 6Blue_cit + 7Other_cit
+8Eprit + 9Eprit  Managit + TSft + Locft + Indft + Job_changeit + 1
0C_fcft + 2
0P_fcf0
+ci + t + "it.
(1)
wit is the log hourly wage of worker i in year t, while Ageit and Age2
it denote, respectively,
the age and age squared of a worker. Eduit corresponds to the number of years of
education and Tenit is the number of years a worker has spent in the current ﬁrm
since hiring (tenure). Managit, Blue_cit, and Other_cit are dummies indicating the job
qualiﬁcation of a worker (respectively manager, blue collar, and other collar) with white
collar being the excluded category. Eprit is a dummy indicating whether worker i has
export experience in t, as deﬁned in Section 3.1, and is the key variable of interest. We
consider both Eprit and its interaction with the dummy Managit to analyze whether
export experience is valued differently between managers and non-managers.
As for other covariates, TSft is a set of dummies for ﬁrm f trade status category
at time t, as deﬁned in Section 3.1, with Never exporters being the excluded category.
Locft stands for a battery of 28 NUTS 3 region dummies corresponding to the location
18of ﬁrm f, while Indft denotes a full set of dummies for the industry (Nace rev.1 2-digits)
to which ﬁrm f belongs. Job_changeit is a rather important control corresponding to
a series of dummies taking value one from the year t a worker changes employer for
the 1st, 2nd, ..., nth time. Indeed, as outlined in Section 3.2, we need these controls to
be sure that the export experience premium does not confound job change patterns in
workers’ wage proﬁles. C_fcft is instead a vector of ﬁrm-time covariates referring to the
current employing ﬁrm f that are likely to affect wages: (i) ﬁrm size (log of employment);
(ii) ﬁrm apparent labor productivity (log of sales per employee); (iii) ﬁrm age (log); (iv)
mean and standard deviation of both age and education of ﬁrm f managers;17 (v) a
foreign ownership dummy;18 (vi) a proxy for ﬁrm f export demand given by Portuguese
yearly aggregate (log) exports of products belonging to the Nace 2-digits industry of ﬁrm
f. By contrast, P_fcf0 is a vector of controls referring to the previous employing ﬁrm f0.
Export experience is in fact an attribute of the worker coming from his past job in an
exporting ﬁrm. In order to isolate this effect from other characteristics of the previous
employer we consider, in the spirit of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), both ﬁrm size and
apparent labor productivity of f0 in the last year of employment of worker i.19 Finally,
ci are worker ﬁxed effects, t indicates time dummies, and "it is a wage shock that we
assume to be uncorrelated with the covariates.
We use the standard within estimator to estimate the parameters of our baseline
equation (1) while clustering standard errors at the worker level. As a robustness check,
we also estimate a variant of (1) with “worker-ﬁrm trade status" ﬁxed effects (ci  TSft)
thereby allowing the value of the relationship to be match-speciﬁc and accounting for
heterogeneity (across ﬁrm trade status) of the return on unobserved time-invariant
worker characteristics. Fixed effects ci  TSft are identiﬁed by workers changing ﬁrms
with different trade status as well as by workers remaining into a ﬁrm that changes trade
status.
In our estimations, we consider two additional speciﬁcations to (1). In the ﬁrst one
(time breakdown), we interact both Eprit and Eprit  Managit with time dummies to
look at the time proﬁle of the export experience premium for both managers and non-
17Inspired by Iranzo et al. (2008), these variables capture the age, and education structure of managers
within the ﬁrm, which is likely to affect ﬁrm productivity and ultimately wages.
18Martins (2010) shows that foreign-owned Portuguese ﬁrms pay their workers more than other ﬁrms.
This pay increase is consistent both with a ‘wage policy effect’ (greater ‘generosity’ in the remuneration
practices of foreign ﬁrms vis-à-vis their domestic counterparts) and a ‘selection effect’ (foreign ﬁrms hire
workers that are, on average, already better remunerated in their domestic ﬁrms than ‘similar’ workers).
19As shown in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), both past and current employer characteristics are key
to determine a worker wage. In their search model with on-the-job-search, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)
stress the importance of ﬁrm labor productivity for which our two covariates represent a reasonable proxy.
In a few cases, the information about ﬁrm size and/or apparent labor productivity of f0 is not available. In
order to cope with this problem we set missing values to zero and make use of two categorical dummies
taking value one whenever the information is not available.
19managers. In the second one (interactions), we consider all possible interactions between
Eprit, Managit and TSft to investigate whether the export experience premium, for both
managers and non-managers, varies depending on the trade status of a ﬁrm.
For our parameters to have a causal interpretation, i.e. being representative of the
whole population of possible worker-ﬁrm matches, we are implicitly imposing the
condition that matching is random conditional on covariates. Though restrictive, our
hypothesis is made somewhat less strong by the fact that we make use of a large
battery of ﬁrm and worker observables, as well as, either worker ﬁxed effects (ci) or
match-speciﬁc worker-ﬁrm trade status ﬁxed effects (ci  TSft).20
4.2 Results
The coefﬁcients of interest in (1) are 8 and 9. By using worker ﬁxed effects ci and
employer change dummies Job_changeit, the identifying variation comes from workers
changing employer while acquiring export experience. Whenever we use worker-ﬁrm
trade status ﬁxed effects (ci  TSft), the identifying variation originates from workers
changing for an employer with the same trade status while acquiring export experience.
Table 4 reports the computed coefﬁcients and standard deviations of 8 and 9, along
with a few summary statistics, coming from the estimation of our baseline speciﬁcation
(1) for the 1997-2004 manufacturing ﬁrms sample whose construction is described in
Section 2.21 Columns 1 and 2 refer to the case of, respectively, worker and worker-
ﬁrm trade status ﬁxed effects. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 refer instead to the time
breakdown speciﬁcation and in particular contain the estimated coefﬁcients and standard
deviations of the interactions between Eprit and Eprit  Managit with time dummies.
Estimates of all of the interaction coefﬁcients between Eprit, Managit and TSft referring
to the second alternative speciﬁcations (interactions) are instead reported in Table 9 in the
Tables Appendix and summarized in a more readable way in Table 5. Finally, estimated
coefﬁcients (along with standard errors) of controls variables have the expected sign and
magnitude and are reported, for all speciﬁcations, in Table 10 in the Tables Appendix. In
all cases, standard errors have been clustered at the worker level.
Insert Tables 4, and 5 about here.
We are interested in answering the following ﬁve questions.
20Bandiera, Guiso, Prat and Sadun (2009) provide an example of how controlling for managerial ability
is important. They ﬁnd that more talented top executives are matched with larger ﬁrms and the level of
managerial pay is increasing in ﬁrm size.
21Results for ﬁrms outside manufacturing are available upon request.
20Question 1: Does export experience pay for a non-manager? The coefﬁcient and signiﬁcance
of Eprit in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 indicate that the premium is actually small and
negative, i.e. a non-manager earns about 2%-3% less upon having export experience.
Question 2: How does the export experience premium evolve over time for a non-manager? The
coefﬁcients and signiﬁcance of interactions between Eprit and time dummies in columns
3 and 4 of Table 4 indicate that the negative premium decreases over time and becomes
basically not signiﬁcant after 7 years.22
Question 3: Does export experience pay for a manager? Contrary to the case of non-
managers, columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 reveal that the sum of the coefﬁcients of Eprit and
Eprit Managit, i.e. the export experience premium for a manager, is positive, large, and
(as indicated by the number of superscripts ) signiﬁcant.23 In estimations with worker
ﬁxed effects, the premium equals 0.054 = 0.073 0.019 log wage points which is actually
larger than the manager premium over a white collar (0.033) reported in column 1 of
Table 10. Estimations with worker-trade status ﬁxed effects convey the same message
with the export experience premium (0.045 = 0.073   0.028) showing to be larger than
the premium of being a manager with respect to a white collar (0.034).24
Question 4: How does the export experience premium evolve over time for a manager?
The coefﬁcients value and the number of superscripts 25 corresponding to the sum
of interactions between Eprit and Eprit  Managit with time dummies in columns 3
and 4 of Table 4 indicate that the premium is signiﬁcantly positive in all years and
increases over time. In the case of worker ﬁxed effects, the premium start at about
5% (0.048 = 0.068   0.020) on the ﬁrst year of export experience and raises steadily to
about 14% (0.141 = 0.147   0.006) in the 7th year of export experience.26 Considering
worker-trade status ﬁxed effects the premium starts at 0.033 and reaches 0.154 at year 7.
Question 5: Does export experience (for both managers and non-managers) pay differently in
22Within our estimation sample years (1997-2004), 7 years is the longest possible length of export
experience. For those cases in which workers have, according to our deﬁnition, export experience already
in 1997 we use the dummy “Other Year of Export Exp” which is also reported in Table 4 both alone and
interacted with manager.
23In columns 1 and 2, , , and  correspond to the 1, 5, and 10% conﬁdence level of the test that the
sum of "Export Exp." and "Manag. X Export Exp." coefﬁcients are different from zero.
24It is worth nothing, however, that the premium of being a manager with respect to a white collar is,
for example, in the case of worker ﬁxed effects identiﬁed by workers changing job qualiﬁcation during the
panel and this is known to deliver much smaller coefﬁcients than in the simple OLS case with no ﬁxed
effects.
25In columns 3 and 4, , , and  correspond to the 1, 5, and 10% conﬁdence level of the tests that
verify, in each year of export experience, if the export experience premium for a manager is signiﬁcantly
different from zero.
26Within our estimation sample years (1997-2004), 7 years is the longest possible length of export
experience. Whenever positive, the average number of years a worker has export experience in our sample
is, due to the relatively short length of the panel, rather small (2.9 years), which helps reconciling the
overall ﬁgure on the export experience premium with its time breakdown.
21trade-involved ﬁrms? The question we are interested in cannot be directly answered by
looking at estimates but needs testing some linear hypotheses involving the coefﬁcients
reported in Table 9. Table 5 directly displays the implied export experience premia,
test statistics, and p-values for both managers and non-managers in the case of worker
and worker-ﬁrm trade status ﬁxed effects. The Table further provides information on
whether the experience premium in trade involved ﬁrms (New, Continuing, Exiting, and
Other) is signiﬁcantly different from the equivalent premium for Never exporters. Table
5 reveals, by looking at the number of  superscripts,27 that two clear patterns emerge.
Considering non-managers, although the negative premium is always smaller for Never
exporters while being not signiﬁcantly different from zero in the case of worker-ﬁrm
trade status ﬁxed effects, there is no single case in which the premium for Never exporters
is signiﬁcantly different from the premium paid by trade involved ﬁrms. On the other
hand, when considering managers, in virtually all cases the positive premium is larger
in trade involved ﬁrms but the difference with respect to Never exporters is signiﬁcant
only for the most trade involved ﬁrms (Continuing exporters).
Overall, our ﬁndings are consistent with the idea that managers are special when
it comes down to exporting and some valuable knowledge is transferred to the new
employer when changing ﬁrm. The (for us) observable export experience of a manager
corresponds to a sizeable positive wage premium (about 5%) which is alive after con-
trolling for a wealth of workers’ and ﬁrms’ characteristics including worker-trade status
ﬁxed effects, past employer size and productivity, and broad employer change patterns.
The premium for managers arises already at the time of employer change and keeps
increasing over time until the maximum time span allowed by our sample (7 years)
reaching a peak of about 15%. On the other hand, non-managers do not seem to receive
any positive premium for their export experience. On average the premium is actually
negative though after 7 years it is virtually zero.
These results are somewhat related to those of Balsvik (2010) who ﬁnds that movers
from MNEs to non-MNEs with more than three years’ tenure from the MNE receive
a wage premium of 5% compared to stayers in non-MNEs. Besides focusing on MNE
rather than exporters, Balsvik (2010) does not explore the distinction between managers
and non-managers nor try to establish a causal relationship between workers’ experience
and ﬁrm performances as we do in Section 5. On the other hand, our ﬁndings suggests
that, contrary to what implicitly assumed in Muendler and Molina (2009), it is not the
experience of all workers which is valuable to the exporting activity of a ﬁrm but only
27, , and  mean, respectively, that the experience premia is signiﬁcantly different from the one of
Never exporters at the 1, 5, and 10% conﬁdence level.
22the experience brought in by managers.28
Furthermore, our ﬁndings point (in some cases) to the existence of a larger export
experience premia for managers in trade-involved ﬁrms with respect to Never exporters,
which suggests that such an experience is more valuable for the former. Point estimates
are virtually all in the expected direction though signiﬁcance is achieved, partially due
to our precision-demanding speciﬁcation with clustering and many controls, only for
the group of ﬁrms that are more involved in trade activities (Continuing exporters).
The statistically weak evidence for a smaller premium paid by Never exporters might
be consistent with a compensating differential mechanisms. For example, a manager
with export experience may, though less valuable for a Never exporter, bargain over a
compensation for a work he/she considers less interesting because not involving trade.
However, it might also indicate that managers with export experience are by some
measure “better” in dimensions that go beyond the export activity. This reasoning call
for caution in interpreting the export experience premium as evidence of a casual effect
of export experience on ﬁrms’ trade performance.
We deal in a more explicit way with the causal link between export experience brought
by managers and the trade performance of a ﬁrm (and in particular its export status) in
the next Section.
5. Trade status analysis
Assessing that a sizeable wage premium is paid only to managers with export experience
and that such a premium is somewhat higher in trade-involved ﬁrms is only indirect
evidence of a causal impact of managerial experience on trade performance. The aim of
this Section is therefore to provide more substantive evidence of such a causality.
There are many different export performance margins to which managers with ex-
port experience might contribute: entry, exit, number of exported products, number of
reached destinations, export value, etc. For the purpose of this study we focus on the
ﬁrst two and model a ﬁrm’s trade status and its change over time as a function of a
large battery of time-varying control as well as of the share of current managers in the
ﬁrm that have export experience. We describe the econometric model in Section 5.1
while presenting estimation results in Section 5.2. In particular, results in Section 5.2.1
28Muendler and Molina (2009) show that anticipated export status, predicted with destination-country
trade instruments, leads ﬁrms to prepare their workforce by hiring workers from other exporters, and that
hiring former exporter workers predicts both a wider reach of destinations and a deeper penetration of
destinations. Muendler and Molina (2009) do not provide evidence of a wage premium nor analyze the
causal impact of workers, and in particular managers, on ﬁrms’ trade performance. The latter relationship
is in fact only described in terms of correlations.
23have been obtained using OLS while results in Section 5.2.2 build on an IV identiﬁcation
strategy.
5.1 Econometric model
In what follows we focus on four (out of ﬁve) of the ﬁnely deﬁned trade status categories
described in Section 3.1, namely: Never exporters, New exporters, Continuing Exporters,
and Exiting exporters. In terms of trade records, New and Never exporters share at
time t the same history: no exports in both t 1 and t 2. However, at date t their paths
suddenly diverge with New exporters starting to export, and keep exporting in t+1, while
Never exporters remain purely domestic ﬁrms. At the other extreme lie Continuing and
Exiting exporters. As in the previous case, both types of ﬁrm have the same trade history
but their present and future (t + 1) participation to the export market follows different
directions. While Continuing exporters keep their presence in foreign markets in (at
least) the next two years, Exiting exporters stop selling abroad in t and maintain their
stand in t+ 1 as well.
We exploit these switches in order to identify the impact of export experience hold
by managers on a ﬁrm likelihood to start or quit exporting. In particular we estimate,
for comparability between standard and IV estimates, a linear probability model.29 In
the ﬁrst part of the analysis, we focus on export entry and compare New and Never
exporters. In the subsequent analysis we turn to export exit and compare Exiting and
Continuing exporters. Our binary variable yft, indicating ﬁrm f trade status at time t,
is equal to zero for Never (Continuing) exporters and equal to one for New (Exiting)
exporters. Our approach follows the logic developed in the dynamic model of exporting
behavior of Roberts and Tybout (1997), and further applied in Bernard and Jensen (2004),
that sunk costs of entry into the export activity create path-dependency. Therefore, any
attempt to establish a causal impact on trade status must condition for the ﬁrm past
trade status; the latter reﬂecting the option value of sunk costs.30 Our speciﬁcation is
slightly more general as we allow managerial experience (as well as other covariates) to
have a differential impact on entry and exit from the export activity. Furthermore, as we
are interested in an "informed/successful/structured" decision to export, as opposed to
a "random/occasional" presence in export markets, our trade status categories are based
29For IV estimations, the linear probability model allows for a larger set of instruments’ tests compared
to the IV probit. Results of the alternative probit speciﬁcation are qualitatively identical and are available
upon request.
30See Irarrazabal and Opromolla (2008) for a general equilibrium model of trade with heterogeneous
ﬁrms that shows how ﬁrm idiosyncratic productivity shocks and export sunk costs imply hysteresis in
export status.
24on the 2+2 years time frame described in Section 3.1.31
The baseline linear probability model that we estimate is given by:
yft =  + 1Shareft + 2Sizeft + 3Prodft + 4Exports_PTft + 0fcft + t + "ft (2)
where the error component "ft captures idiosyncratic shocks affecting ﬁrms’ trade status
and whose properties will be further discussed below. The set of covariates includes time
dummies t as well as:
1. Our key variable Shareft which is the number of managers with export experience
(acquired outside the ﬁrm) in ﬁrm f at time t divided by the total number of
managers. If a ﬁrm has no manager with export experience Shareft is equal to
zero.
2. Sizeft and Prodft denote ﬁrm f size (log of employment) and apparent labor
productivity (log of sales per employee) at time t. As shown in Bernard and Jensen
(1999) and Melitz (2003) ﬁrm size, and especially productivity, has a causal impact
on export participation and should certainly be taken into account in our analysis.
3. Exports_PTft denotes a proxy for ﬁrm f export demand and is given by Portuguese
yearly aggregate (log) exports of products belonging to the Nace 2-digits industry
of ﬁrm f in year t. Indeed, a favorable (adverse) foreign demand shock can induce
ﬁrms to enter (quit) exporting and needs to be accounted for.
4. fcft indicates a battery of ﬁrm-time controls: (i) the ﬁrm-level mean and standard
deviation of managers’ age and education as well as the ﬁrm-level mean and
standard deviation of managers’ (with and without experience) ﬁxed effects, as a
measure of skill, coming from the estimation of (1). Inspired by Iranzo et al. (2008),
these variables capture the age, education, and skill structure of managers within
31We believe that controlling for export status in the preceding two years, besides allowing for a
sufﬁciently large sample, is enough for accounting for the ﬁrm trade history. In Bernard and Jensen (2004)
main speciﬁcations only two lags are considered. The magnitude of the coefﬁcient of "Last exported two
years ago" is signiﬁcant though being between 30 and 40 percent the magnitude of the coefﬁcient "Exported
last year". Moreover, Roberts and Tybout (1997) ﬁnd that "...last year’s exporting status Yi,t 1 has a strong
positive effect on the probability of exporting this year. But plants that last exported two or three years ago
enjoy only small lingering effects from their previous investments in foreign-market access." and further
add that "...we cannot reject the hypothesis that both coefﬁcients are jointly equal to zero."
25the ﬁrm, which is likely to affect ﬁrm productivity and ultimately export status;32
(ii) a foreign ownership dummy. This is an important control as it is well known
that multinationals are more involved into trade; (iii) ﬁrm age, which broadly
accounts for the ﬁrm past success; (iv) a full set of Nace rev.1 2-digits dummies;
(v) a full battery of NUTS 3 region dummies corresponding to the location of ﬁrm
f.
We further consider two additional reﬁnements of (2). In the ﬁrst one, we investigate
whether the share of managers with export experience is more or less valuable for trade
status depending on ﬁrm size and productivity. This is a relevant theory and policy issue
in the debate on ﬁrm heterogeneity and trade. To this end, we estimate an augmented
version of (2) by adding two interaction terms: Shareft  Sizeft and Shareft  Prodft.
We then consider a second variant of (2) in which we look at the time proﬁle of the
arrival of managers with export experience. In particular we consider managers arriving
in t, t   1, t   2, or before33 and replace Shareft with four variables like, for example,
Sharet 1
ft which corresponds to the number of managers with export experience in ﬁrm
f at time t that have been hired in t  1 divided by the total number of managers in t.
We cluster standard errors at the ﬁrm-level in all speciﬁcations. All right hand side
variables (except dummies) have been divided by their respective standard deviation in
order to provide a comparable metric. Given the rough equivalence between coefﬁcients
of a linear probability model and marginal effects of a probit (evaluated at the sample
mean), a coefﬁcient of, for example, Sizeft of 0.0x indicates that a one standard deviation
increase in ﬁrm size roughly increases the probability of being a New exporter by x%.
Marginal effects are thus comparable, in term of how much variation in probability is
induced, across covariates and speciﬁcations within a given comparison pair (e.g. Exiting
vs Continuing) and, by means of the unconditional probability, also between the two
comparison pairs.
5.2 Results
In the next Section we provide results from the estimation of the linear probability model
(2) obtained using OLS, while in the subsequent one we use an IV strategy to account for
32Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Kremer (1993) have emphasized that in some activities, like compli-
cated manufacturing processes, workers performing different tasks are highly complementary (supermod-
ular production functions); in the "O-Ring production function", failure at any task destroys the entire value
of the project. On the contrary, in activities requiring creativity or problem solving, superior performance
of one task might mitigate the need for superior performance in the others (submodular production
functions). Grossman and Maggi (2000) propose a model of trade where aggregate trade patterns reﬂect
differences in the distribution of talent across the labor forces of two different countries.
33In some cases we are not able to precisely identify the year of entry of a manager observed in t. In this
situation we classify the managers as having arrived before t-2.
26the potential endogeneity of Shareft due to simultaneity and omitted variables.
5.2.1 OLS estimations
Under the assumption that "ft in (2) is uncorrelated with explanatory variable, and in
particular with Shareft, our linear probability model can be estimated with OLS. Table
6 shows estimation results for the key covariates of the three different speciﬁcations we
consider for both the New vs Never Exporters and Exiting vs Continuing exporters com-
parison. Table 11 in the Tables Appendix provides information on the other regressors.
New vs Never exporters
Column 1 of Table 6 reports the results of our baseline New vs Never exporters
speciﬁcation. The sign, magnitude, and signiﬁcance of the share of managers with
export experience variable indicate, when considering that the unconditional probability
of being a New exporter (yft = 1) equals 0.051, that the effect we are capturing is rather
sizeable. A one standard deviation increase in Shareft increases the likelihood of start
exporting by 0.018 probability units corresponding to about 35% more chances to be a
New exporter. Such magnitude is equal to the one of ﬁrm productivity while ﬁrm size
is almost twice as important. However export demand, which due to time dummies is
essentially identiﬁed by its time variation,34 is the most important covariate with yearly
Portuguese Nace 2-digit exports getting a coefﬁcient of 0.045. Size and productivity
have been widely shown to have a sizeable (and causal) impact on export status and our
results conﬁrm previous ﬁndings. What our results add to the existing literature on trade
and heterogeneous ﬁrms is that the transmission of export experience via the mobility of
managers is as important as ﬁrm productivity in explaining entry into the export activity.
Insert Table 6 about here.
Column 2 of Table 6, where we interact the share of experienced managers with size
and productivity, further indicates that export experience is more valuable in larger ﬁrms.
This result is important in the policy debate on export promotion because, to the extent
that the presence of managers with export experience allows ﬁrms to reduce trade and
information costs related to doing business overseas, it suggests that larger ﬁrms can
disproportionately gain from support received along these dimensions. Finally column
3, where we consider the time proﬁle of the arrival of managers with export experience,
points to a very stable time pattern. The value of export experience for becoming an
exporter does not seem to depend much upon the date when the manager has joined the
ﬁrm.
34Some additional identifying variation is provided by ﬁrms changing Nace code.
27Exiting vs Continuing exporters
Column 4 of Table 6 displays key covariates estimates of our baseline Exiting vs
Continuing speciﬁcation. The unconditional probability to quit exporting (yft = 1) equals
0.035 meaning that 3.5% of ﬁrms with a past record of two years of continuous exports
exit from foreign markets in both the current and subsequent year.
Firm size and productivity play (as in the case of entry into the export activity) a major
role also in understanding the failure of ﬁrms to keep exporting. Big and more productive
ﬁrms are more likely to have a successful path with the magnitude of productivity
(size) implying that a one standard deviation increase in productivity (size) reduces the
probability of exiting by 37% (74%). On the other hand, export demand has the expected
sign but it is now smaller and largely not signiﬁcant.
As for export experience results are rather different from the entry case. The coefﬁcient
of Shareft is negative, which would suggest that export experience has a positive impact
on the probability to keep exporting, but it is rather small and not signiﬁcant. Indeed,
both Exiting and Continuing ﬁrms have managers that have developed export experience
within the ﬁrm with its past export activity and our ﬁndings would suggest that internal
and external experience do not complement each other. Nevertheless, the interactions
speciﬁcation in column 5 portraits a more complex picture. The coefﬁcient of Shareft is
negative and signiﬁcant while the interaction with size is positive and signiﬁcant. This
means that, for small ﬁrms, export experience acquired by managers from previous em-
ployers has a large positive effect on the likelihood to successfully continue international
business. However, this effect gets smaller as ﬁrm size increases. Finally, as far as the
time proﬁle of experienced managers’ arrival is concerned, column 6 indicates that there
is some signiﬁcant pattern at time t   1 and t   2. Though the magnitude is small, the
negative sign of Sharet 1
ft and Sharet 2
ft suggests that not having enough managers with
export experience entering in t   1 and t   2 makes it more likely for a ﬁrm to quit
exporting in t.
5.2.2 IV estimations
In the previous Section we dealt with endogeneity, and in particular with the issue of
omitted variables, by making use of a large battery of both ﬁrm and ﬁrm-level aggregated
managers’ characteristics. However, we acknowledge that there are still issues that are
likely to bias our results.
The ﬁrst endogeneity issue we face is that there could be some (for us) unobservable
ﬁrm characteristics that affect trade status and are correlated with the entry of managers
with export experience. Considering, for example, the comparison of New and Never we
do not have an observable measure of variables like R&D expenditure, product, process
28and IT innovation that are likely to affect the export participation of a ﬁrm.35 Although
we do control for the two key variables that are believed to have a causal impact on trade
participation (size and productivity), the fact that we cannot control for other dimensions
of the competitiveness of the ﬁrms and/or for the amount of effort put in place by a
ﬁrm to become an exporter might induce a spurious correlation with export experience.
Although the evidence coming from the wage analysis does indicate that trade involved
ﬁrms pay for managers’ export experience, this might be ultimately just due to such
managers having some unobservable time-variant characteristics which are not valuable
to the ﬁrm for her export activity conditional on all those ﬁrms’ fundamentals that truly
cause export participation. For example, managers with export experience might be very
good in dealing with product and/or process innovation with innovation having a causal
impact on export status while being not observable to us.
The second endogeneity problem is related to the timing of events. Considering again
the comparison of New and Never, it seems at ﬁrst glance crucial to deﬁne when the
“preparation for exporting” begins, i.e. when the decision to try to become an exporter
takes place. The extreme case is the one of a ﬁrm that puts in place a wide range of
policies at some date t   x to become an exporter in t while sticking to this decision no
matter what happens between t x and t. The ﬁrm could then hire managers with export
experience between t   x and t only to make this process somehow smoother. In such a
model a causal effect of managers’ experience could be eventually identiﬁed only when
the managers joined the ﬁrm before or in the meantime the decision to export in t   x
took place. We do not necessarily believe that this extreme model is a good description
of a choice like exporting under such a high degree of uncertainty and continuously
available new information, but we have to contemplate this possibility.
Finally, both in the previous extreme case and in a situation in which a ﬁrm contin-
uously revises her decision to export based on the new available information we still
face a problem of simultaneity. Both the entry of managers with export experience and
other investments put in place by a ﬁrm can have a causal impact on export status but,
being the outcome of a joint maximization process, it is hard to properly disentangle
their respective contribution as a shock affecting the proﬁtability of one margin has an
impact on the optimal choice of all the others.
Insert Figures 7 and 8 about here.
The three endogeneity issues discussed so far are equivalent to say that managers
with export experience are not randomly assigned to ﬁrms. In an ideal experimental
setting, managers would indeed be randomly assigned to ﬁrms providing the basis for
35Bustos (2010) and Lileeva and Treﬂer (2010) provide evidence of the relationship between innovation,
productivity, trade liberalization, and trade status.
29a clear cut causal analysis on ﬁrms’ trade status. The IV strategy we implement draws
on some exogenous variation in managers’ demand and supply in order to mimic as
far as possible a random matching between managers with export experience and ﬁrms.
On the demand side, we use the ratio of managers to workers in year t   3 (Ratioft 3)
as a predictor of subsequent managers’ hiring by a given ﬁrm. Indeed, as shown in
Figure 7, there is a small (-0.057) but signiﬁcant negative correlation between Ratioft 3
and ﬁrm hiring in between t  2 and t. Being a substantial part of managers with export
experience in t arrived within the last two years (about 42%, see Table 1), this instrument
is ultimately correlated with the share of experience managers at time t and, following
Roberts and Tybout (1997), 3 years can be considered a sufﬁciently long time span for the
past not to matter for export status.
On the managers’ supply side, we consider the local availability (within a NUTS 3
region) of managers that change ﬁrm because of displacement, as deﬁned in Section
3.1, and we focus in particular on ﬁrm closure. As outlined in Dustmann and Meghir
(2005), a ﬁrm closure can be thought to be an exogenous shock to a worker’s career,
since it results in a separation of all plant’s workers and it is not related to the worker’s
own job performance. Furthermore, for a variety of reasons that can be considered as
exogenous in our analysis (like housing property, family ties, etc.), workers tend to search
and accept more easily new jobs in the same location of the past job.36 Combining these
two arguments, the local availability of displaced managers with export experience can
be considered as an exogenous labor supply for local ﬁrms. More precisely, we construct
a variable (PAMEft) which equals the ratio of the number of displaced managers with
export experience in the NUTS 3 region of ﬁrm f in year t to the number of managers
with export experience in the same location-year.
The instrument PAMEft is, due to time dummies, essentially identiﬁed by its time
variation.37 As shown by Figure 8, PAMEft displays a substantial time (as well as
spatial) variation which is needed in order to provide identiﬁcation.
We consider Ratioft 3, PAMEft, PAMEft 1, and PAMEft 2 and use them both
alone, as well as interacted up to the third power, as instruments for Shareft.38 Table
7 shows IV estimation results for the key covariates, as well as tests on instruments, of
the three different speciﬁcations we consider for both the New vs Never Exporters and
Exiting vs Continuing exporters comparison. Table 12 in the Tables Appendix provides
information on the other regressors.
36In our sample, 78.2% of the workers and 67.1% of the managers that change employer do remain in
the same NUTS 3 region.
37Some additional identifying variation is provided by ﬁrms changing region.
38When considering in our third speciﬁcation the time proﬁle of managers’ arrival, we use the same set
of variables to instrument Sharet
ft, Sharet 1
ft , and Sharet 2
ft .
30Two further comments are in order. First, one can to some extent argue that ﬁrm
closure is related to the ability of the managers running the ﬁrm. However, to the extent
that the ability of the “bad” displaced manager is reﬂected by its wage, our two controls
for the mean and standard deviation of ﬁrm f managers’ ﬁxed effects should account
for that. Second, ﬁrm closure might be related to industry-speciﬁc shocks that also
affect entry and exit into the export activity. Besides industry ﬁxed effects, our control
Exports_PTft should broadly account for demand shocks affecting the trade status of
ﬁrms within a Nace 2-digit industry. As for supply shocks, the fact that we rely on the
availability of displaced managers within a location (as opposed to location-industry) for
the construction of PAMEft and that (at this level of industry disaggregation) NUTS 3
regions are quite diversiﬁed, should make this issue less problematic.
New vs Never exporters
Key IV estimates of the comparison between New and Never exporters are contained
in columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 7. The unconditional probability of being a New exporter
is slightly different from the OLS case and now equals 0.046.39
Insert Table 7 about here.
Column 1 of Table 7 reveals that, after instrumenting, the share of managers with ex-
port experience is still signiﬁcant and matters even more. With a point estimate of 0.064,
Shareft is now the most important determinant (in term of probability increase per unit
of standard deviation) of the export entry process with a one standard deviation increase
leading to more than double the probability to start exporting. Both the Kleibergen-Paap
rk LM statistic (under-identiﬁcation test) and the Hansen J statistic (over-identifying
restrictions tests) works ﬁne. However, the value of the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F
statistic (weak instruments test) suggests that, even if critical values are not available,40
we might have a problem of weak instruments meaning that the point estimate of 0.064
should, though quite different from the OLS estimate,41 be taken with some caution.
Concerning column 2, we still ﬁnd after instrumenting that there is a positive interac-
tion between Shareft and size. However, the Hansen J statistic points to the presence of
some residual endogeneity in this speciﬁcation and so further caution is needed. Finally,
the time breakdown of managers’ arrival analysis in column 3 indicates, contrary to the
OLS case, that year t is the key one. All of the effect of Shareft seems to be due to the
39The number of observation is reduced with respect to OLS estimations due to the fact that Ratioft 3 is
sometimes missing. The same issue arises for the comparison between Exiting and Continuing exporters.
40The critical values provided in Stock and Yogo (2005) refer to the case of homoskedastic errors only.
41As shown in Stock and Yogo (2005), in the case of weak instruments the IV estimator is biased towards
the probability limit of the OLS estimator and, in the extreme case of irrelevant instruments, the expectation
of the IV estimator corresponds to the OLS limit. The fact that IV and OLS estimates are rather different
in our case is thus reassuring about the weakness of instruments.
31arrival of managers at t with arrivals in t   1 and t   2 being not signiﬁcant.42 Though,
the under-identiﬁcation test statistic suggests this might partly be due to some lack of
precision of our estimates.
Exiting vs Continuing exporters
IV estimates of core covariates for the comparison between Exiting and Continuing
exporters are showed in columns 4, 5, and 6 of Table 7 and the unconditional probability
of being an Exiting exporter is still 0.035.
The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic indicates that the ﬁrst two speciﬁcations of
this second set of IV estimates suffer much less from weak instrumenting. However,
none of the instrumented variables is signiﬁcant. We thus conclude that, after controlling
for endogeneity, export experience acquired by managers from previous employers has
no effect on the likelihood to successfully continue international business, i.e. internal
and external export experience are substitutes. Note that this results does not necessarily
contradict the evidence provided in Section 4 on the export experience premium. The
fact that continuing exporters seems to particularly value this experience might be due to
trade performance margins other than the capacity to keep exporting like, for example,
the number of exported products and/or the number of reached destinations. Finally,
column 6 seems to suggest (as in the previous case) that t is the key date with the lack of
a sufﬁcient inﬂow of managers with (external) export experience playing an important
role in the exit process. However, both the under-identiﬁcation and weak instruments
tests statistics warn about estimates and/or standard errors bias.
6. Conclusions
To some extent our ﬁndings are not terribly surprising. The fact that workers acquire
some valuable export-related knowledge by working in exporting ﬁrms and are then able
to successfully transfer some of this knowledge to new employing ﬁrms seems a priori
obvious. What it it not obvious is that only export experience brought by managers
matters. What it is not clear a priori is whether such an experience coming from outside
the ﬁrm eventually substitutes or complements pre-existing available knowledge within
the ﬁrm. What it is surprising in our ﬁndings is that managers’ export experience matters
so much for both wages and entry into the export activity.
There are several directions deserving further research and in what follows we propose
some. First, in our framework we consider the impact of export experience on entry and
exit into the export activity. However, there are other export performance margins that
42Note that the share of managers arrived before t-2 is, for obvious reasons, not instrumented and so we
refrain from comment on it.
32can be fruitfully explored like the number of exported products, the number of reached
destinations, and the volume of exports by country-product. On a more dynamic basis,
also exports growth and their volatility could possibly be part of future research on
this topic. A somewhat related second avenue of research is to determine what is the
nature of the knowledge transferred by managers. For example, does the presence of
managers with export experience increases the likelihood of entry because it improves
a ﬁrm competitiveness beyond what can be captured by ﬁrm size and productivity?
Alternatively, do these managers help reducing trade costs and/or uncertainty? Or
maybe they simply increase ﬁrms’ demand by bringing valuable clients’ contacts? We
are unable to answer these question here but, certainly, the analysis of the different
margins of export performance will provide precious elements for this debate. In the
same vein, a ﬁner classiﬁcation of the different functional categories of managers (sales,
ﬁnance, advertising, CEO, etc.) can turn out to be very useful to shed further light on the
nature of the information ﬂow we have identiﬁed.
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36Table 1: Summary Statistics, Wage and Trade Status Regressions, 2004 (from 1997-2004 Sample)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. N
Worker-level
Hourly Wage (log) 1.373 0.521 1.244 0.731 3.415 386,062
Export Experience (0/1) 0.176 0.381 0 0 1 386,062
Manager w/ Export Exp. (0/1) 0.028 0.164 0 0 1 386,062
Age (Years) 38.421 10.651 38 16 65 386,062
Education (Years) 7.445 3.66 6 0 16 386,062
Tenure (Years) 10.582 9.509 8 0 52 386,062
Manager (0/1) 0.151 0.358 0 0 1 386,062
Blue Collar (0/1) 0.738 0.44 1 0 1 386,062
White Collar (0/1) 0.061 0.24 0 0 1 386,062
Other Collar (0/1) 0.05 0.218 0 0 1 386,062
Firm-level
Manag. w/Export Exp. (Share) 0.129 0.279 0 0 1 12,342
– Hired in t (Share) 0.017 0.100 0 0 1 12,342
– Hired in t-1 (Share) 0.019 0.112 0 0 1 12,342
– Hired in t-2 (Share) 0.019 0.112 0 0 1 12,342
– Hired bef. t-2 (Share) 0.074 0.213 0 0 1 12,342
New Exporter (0/1) 0.029 0.168 0 0 1 12,342
Continuing Exporter (0/1) 0.205 0.404 0 0 1 12,342
Exiting Exporter (0/1) 0.008 0.089 0 0 1 12,342
Other Exporter (0/1) 0.253 0.435 0 0 1 12,342
Never Exporter (0/1) 0.505 0.5 1 0 1 12,342
Firm Size (log) 2.919 1.235 2.89 0 8.266 12,342
Apparent Labor Productivity (log) 10.6 0.983 10.567 6.11 16.341 12,342
Firm Age (log) 2.575 0.845 2.708 0 5.517 12,342
Foreign Ownership (0/1) 0.049 0.216 0 0 1 12,342
Managers’ Age (Average) 42.268 8.486 42 19 65 12,342
Managers’ Age (Std. Dev.) 4.327 5.137 2.121 0 31.82 12,342
Managers’ Education (Average) 8.757 3.613 9 0 16 12,342
Managers’ Education (Std. Dev.) 1.664 2.182 0 0 11.314 12,342
Exports PT (log) 14.232 0.836 14.38 11.326 15.44 12,342
Notes: This table shows summary statistics of worker-level and ﬁrm-level variables used in our regressions for the 2004 sample
year. Variable names followed by "(0/1)" refer to dummy variables. In the last column, "N" refers to the number of workers for
worker-level variables, and to the number of ﬁrms for ﬁrm-level variables. See Section 3.1 for deﬁnitions of ﬁrms’ trade status,
managers, and export experience. Statistics refers to observations for which all covariates, except in the IV case, are jointly available.
37Table 2: Number of Workers and Managers, by Export Experience, Displacement
Status, and Year, 1997-2004
Workers Managers
Year All With Export Displaced with All With Export Displaced with
Experience Export Exp. Experience Export Exp.
1997 452,550 14,675 1,749 48,366 2,075 219
1998 446,496 24,219 853 50,990 3,404 122
1999 449,453 36,444 1,717 50,413 4,767 211
2000 438,023 48,722 4,341 51,339 6,501 555
2002 350,522 53,425 3,130 48,601 8,344 649
2003 372,782 61,100 2,207 54,788 9,716 399
2004 386,062 68,123 0 58,140 10,704 0
Notes: This table shows summary statistics of worker-level variables from the sample used in the wage regressions
of Section 4. See Section 3.1 for deﬁnitions of managers, export experience, and displacement status.
Table 3: Number of Firms and Share of Managers with Export Experience, by
Trade Status and Year, 1997-2004
Year All Firms New Continuing Exiting Other Never
Exporter Exporter Exporter Exporter Exporter
Number of Firms
1997 8,032 186 2,158 69 2,424 3,195
1998 8,133 181 2,258 60 2,084 3,550
1999 8,467 165 2,279 93 2,332 3,598
2000 8,871 224 2,306 73 2,428 3,840
2002 8,748 201 2,167 89 2,697 3,594
2003 11,020 262 2,409 96 3,081 5,172
2004 12,342 358 2,529 99 3,119 6,237
Share of Managers with Export Experience
1997 0.030 0.064 0.027 0.018 0.046 0.018
1998 0.047 0.126 0.047 0.040 0.077 0.026
1999 0.069 0.112 0.076 0.042 0.095 0.046
2000 0.094 0.141 0.102 0.090 0.126 0.066
2002 0.127 0.211 0.138 0.119 0.156 0.093
2003 0.122 0.248 0.150 0.112 0.154 0.084
2004 0.129 0.242 0.164 0.157 0.156 0.095
Notes: This table shows summary statistics of ﬁrm-level variables from the sample used in the OLS trade
status regressions of Section 5. See Section 3.1 for deﬁnitions of ﬁrms’ trade status, managers, and export
experience.
38Table 4: Wage Regression - Baseline and Time Breakdown - Core Covariates
Covariates Baseline Baseline Time Breakdown Time Breakdown
Worker FE Worker-Trade Worker FE Worker-Trade
Status FE Status FE
Export Exp. (0/1) -0.019a -0.028a
(0.002) (0.003)
Manag. X Export Exp. (0/1) 0.073a 0.073a
(0.003) (0.004)
1st Year of Export Exp. -0.020a -0.031a
(0.002) (0.003)
2nd Year of Export Exp. -0.022a -0.028a
(0.003) (0.004)
3rd Year of Export Exp. -0.015a -0.019a
(0.003) (0.004)
4th Year of Export Exp. -0.006b -0.008b
(0.003) (0.004)
5th Year of Export Exp. -0.016a -0.023a
(0.003) (0.004)
6th Year of Export Exp. -0.004 -0.016a
(0.003) (0.004)
7th Year of Export Exp. -0.006 -0.010c
(0.004) (0.006)
Other Year of Export Exp. -0.007a -0.011a
(0.002) (0.002)
Manager X 1st Yr Export Exp. 0.068a 0.064a
(0.004) (0.005)
Manager X 2nd Yr Export Exp. 0.068a 0.066a
(0.004) (0.005)
Manager X 3rd Yr Export Exp. 0.089a 0.080a
(0.004) (0.005)
Manager X 4th Yr Export Exp. 0.105a 0.116a
(0.006) (0.007)
Manager X 5th Yr Export Exp. 0.118a 0.129a
(0.005) (0.006)
Manager X 6th Yr Export Exp. 0.124a 0.135a
(0.007) (0.008)
Manager X 7th Yr Export Exp. 0.147a 0.164a
(0.010) (0.011)
Manager X Other Yr Export Exp. -0.049a -0.044a
(0.006) (0.007)
Constant -2.353a -2.316a -2.350a -2.307a
(0.099) (0.087) (0.099) (0.087)
Observations 2,895,888 2,895,888 2,895,888 2,895,888
R2 0.366 0.352 0.367 0.353
Number of workers 1,050,252 1,050,252
Number of workers-trade status 1,395,980 1,395,980
Notes: Key covariates results from the within estimation of the mincerian wage equation (1) for both
the baseline and time breakdown speciﬁcations. Other covariates are listed in Table 10. The dependent
variable is a worker log hourly wage in euros as deﬁned in details in the Data Appendix. The speciﬁcations
in columns 1 and 3 include worker ﬁxed effects while the speciﬁcations in columns 2 and 4 include "worker-
ﬁrm trade status" ﬁxed effects. All speciﬁcations include a set of NUTS 3 region dummies, NACE 2-digits
industry dummies and year dummies. In columns 1 and 2, the export experience premium for a non-
manager is directly given by the “Export Exp.” coefﬁcient. The export experience premium for a manager
is instead given by the sum of “Export Exp.” and “Manag. X Export Exp.” coefﬁcients. The same procedure
extends to columns 3 and 4. Standard errors clustered at the worker-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01,
bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1. In columns 1 and 2, , , and  correspond to the 1, 5, and 10% conﬁdence level of
the test that the sum of “Export Exp.” and “Manag. X Export Exp.” coefﬁcients are different from zero. In
columns 3 and 4, they are associated to a series of tests that verify, in each year of export experience, if the
export experience premium for a manager is signiﬁcantly different from zero. See Section 3.1 for deﬁnitions
of managers and export experience.
39Table 5: Wage Regression - Interactions - Hypotheses Testing
Never New Continuing Exiting Other














Experience premia -0.011a -0.037a -0.020a -0.032a -0.018a
F-Test Statistic value 14.13 138.36 74.94 41.17 56.65
P-value 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Worker-Trade Status FE
Experience premia -0.015 0.007 -0.024a -0.076 -0.033a
F-Test Statistic value 1.09 0.09 47.35 0.31 89.75










Experience premia 0.044a 0.045a 0.061a 0.050a 0.052a
F-Test Statistic value 31.00 43.30 213.36 13.10 157.59
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000
Worker-Trade Status FE
Experience premia 0.015 -0.008 0.059a 0.072 0.024a
F-Test Statistic value 0.50 0.01 110.21 0.80 14.88
P-value 0.4778 0.9171 0.0000 0.3716 0.0001
Notes: This table includes results from linear hypotheses tests based on the within estimation of mincerian wage equation
(1) with interactions between experience, manager, and trade status. Covariates’ estimates and standard deviations are
reported in Tables 9 and 10. The dependent variable is a worker log hourly wage in euros as deﬁned in details in the
Data Appendix. Both results based on worker ﬁxed effects and "worker-ﬁrm trade status" ﬁxed effects are provided. Both
speciﬁcations include a set of NUTS 3 region dummies, NACE 2-digits industry dummies and year dummies. a, b, and c
mean, respectively, that the experience premium is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10% conﬁdence level.
, , and  mean, respectively, that the experience premia is signiﬁcantly different from the one of Never exporters at
the 1, 5, and 10% conﬁdence level. Test statistics and p-value are corrected for worker-level clustering. See Section 3.1 for
deﬁnitions of ﬁrms’ trade status, managers, and export experience.
40Table 6: Trade Status Regressions Core Covariates - OLS
Covariates





Productivity Breakdown Productivity Breakdown
Manag. w/Export Exp. (Share) 0.018a -0.035 -0.001 -0.040c
(0.002) (0.022) (0.002) (0.022)
Export Exp. X Size 0.029a 0.011b
(0.007) (0.005)
Export Exp. X Productivity 0.027 0.029
(0.020) (0.021)
Manag. w/Export Exp. Hired in t (Share) 0.008a -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Manag. w/Export Exp. Hired in t-1 (Share) 0.010a -0.002b
(0.002) (0.001)
Manag. w/Export Exp. Hired in t-2 (Share) 0.008a -0.002c
(0.002) (0.001)
Manag. w/Export Exp. Hired bef. t-2 (Share) 0.011a 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Firm Size (log) 0.031a 0.027a 0.031a -0.026a -0.027a -0.026a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
App. Labor Productivity (log) 0.018a 0.017a 0.018a -0.013a -0.014a -0.013a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Exports PT (log) 0.045a 0.045a 0.045a -0.005 -0.006 -0.005
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.468) (0.409) (0.489)
Constant -0.973a -0.953a -0.973a 0.381b 0.414b 0.377b
(0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.160) (0.161) (0.160)
Observations 30,763 30,763 30,763 16,685 16,685 16,685
R2 0.053 0.055 0.053 0.032 0.033 0.033
Notes: Results for the key covariates of OLS estimations of the trade status equation (2). Results of other covariates are reported in Table 11. The ﬁrst three columns display
estimations referring to the comparison of New vs Never exporters, while the last three columns refer to the comparison of Exiting vs Continuing exporters. The dependent
variable is a binary indicator taking value one whenever a ﬁrm is a New (Exiting) exporter and zero otherwise. The unconditional probability of being a New (Exiting) exporter
is 0.051 (0.035). The key variable in our analysis is the share of managers with export experience currently employed by the ﬁrm : Manag. w/Export Exp. (Share). In columns 1
and 4 we consider this variable alone, while in columns 2 and 5 (3 and 6) we consider it interaction with ﬁrm size and productivity (its time breakdown). All covariates, except
dummies, have been divided by their respective standard deviation in order to deliver a comparable metric in terms of the variation of the dependent variable which is explained
by a one standard deviation change in the dependent variable. All speciﬁcations include a set of NACE 2-digits industry dummies, NUTS 3-digit region dummies, and year
dummies. Standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1. See Section 3.1 for deﬁnitions of ﬁrms’ trade status, managers, and export
experience.
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1Table 7: Trade Status Regressions Core Covariates - Instrumental Variables
Covariates





Productivity Breakdown Productivity Breakdown
Manag. w/Export Exp. (Share) 0.064b -0.229 0.021 0.182
(0.026) (0.144) (0.049) (0.186)
Export Exp. X Size 0.095b -0.045
(0.042) (0.031)
Export Exp. X Productivity 0.160 -0.139
(0.116) (0.149)
Manag. w/Export Exp. Hired in t (Share) 0.067c -0.122b
(0.039) (0.054)
Manag. w/Export Exp. Hired in t-1 (Share) 0.014 0.034
(0.043) (0.053)
Manag. w/Export Exp. Hired in t-2 (Share) -0.058 -0.064
(0.046) (0.052)
Manag. w/Export Exp. Hired bef. t-2 (Share) 0.011a -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Firm Size (log) 0.023a 0.018a 0.028a -0.028a -0.020a -0.026a
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
App. Labor Productivity (log) 0.019a 0.014a 0.021a -0.014a -0.008c -0.014a
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Exports PT (log) 0.045a 0.041a 0.038a -0.002 -0.002 -0.007
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations 24,785 24,785 24,785 15,956 15,956 15,956
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 57.607 127.345 40.898 45.644 125.815 20.918
(Under-identiﬁcation) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0235) (0.0139) (0.0006) (0.6971)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 2.167 1.954 1.404 10.320 10.480 0.613
(Weak-identiﬁcation)
Hansen J statistic 22.791 116.678 21.104 48.915 82.078 28.624
(Over-identifying restrictions) (0.6447) (0.0030) (0.6326) (0.0042) (0.3541) (0.2346)
Notes: Results for the key covariates of IV estimations of the trade status equation (2). Results of other covariates are reported in Table 12. The ﬁrst three columns display
estimations referring to the comparison of New vs Never exporters, while the last three columns refer to the comparison of Exiting vs Continuing exporters. The dependent
variable is a binary indicator taking value one whenever a ﬁrm is a New (Exiting) exporter and zero otherwise. The unconditional probability of being a New (Exiting) exporter
is 0.046 (0.035). The key variable in our analysis is the share of managers with export experience currently employed by the ﬁrm : Manag. w/Export Exp. (Share). In columns
1 and 4 we consider this variable alone, while in columns 2 and 5 (3 and 6) we consider it interaction with ﬁrm size and productivity (its time breakdown). The two variables
used to construct our instruments are the ﬁrm-level managers to employees ratio at time t-3 and a measure (PAME) of the local (NUTS 3 region of the ﬁrm) availability of
displaced managers with export experience. Both these variables and their interactions up to the power three are used as core instruments. In the case of column 2 and 5 we
also consider as instruments the interactions of the core instruments with ﬁrm size an productivity. Further details are provided in Section 5.2.2. All covariates, except dummies,
have been divided by their respective standard deviation in order to deliver a comparable metric in terms of the variation of the dependent variable which is explained by a one
standard deviation change in the dependent variable. All speciﬁcations include a set of NACE 2-digits industry dummies, NUTS 3-digit region dummies, and year dummies.
Standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1. See Section 3.1 for deﬁnitions of ﬁrms’ trade status, managers, export experience, and
displacement status.
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Notes: This Figure shows the kernel density of the log hourly wage distribution in the 2004 sample for non-managers, broken down
by ﬁrm export status. The hourly wage is deﬁned in the Data Appendix. The deﬁnitions of managers and ﬁrms’ export status
categories are provided in Section 3.1. The kernel is Epanechnikov and the kernel width is the Stata default one.
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Notes: This Figure shows the kernel density of the log hourly wage distribution in the 2004 sample for managers, broken down by
ﬁrm export status. The hourly wage is deﬁned in the Data Appendix. The deﬁnitions of managers and ﬁrms’ export status categories
are provided in Section 3.1. The kernel is Epanechnikov and the kernel width is the Stata default one.
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Notes: This Figure shows the kernel density of the log hourly wage distribution in the 2004 sample for managers, broken down by
ﬁrm export status and manager export experience. The hourly wage is deﬁned in the Data Appendix. The deﬁnitions of managers,
export experience and ﬁrms’ export status categories are provided in Section 3.1. The kernel is Epanechnikov and the kernel width
is the Stata default one.





























































Year t 3 Year t 2 Year t 1 Year t Year t+1 Year t+2
treated control
difference
Notes: This Figure provides a graphical overview of a simple difference-in-difference exercise. We consider only those workers that
change ﬁrm only once in the 1997-2004 period and are managers in the new ﬁrm. The treated group is represented by managers
moving to another ﬁrm while contemporaneously gaining export experience in t 2 [1997,2004]. The control group is represented
by managers moving to another ﬁrm in t but not gaining export experience because the former employer was not an exporter. The
Figure provides the average log wage of both the treated and control group (left axis), as well as their difference (right axis), in
between t  3 and t+ 2. The deﬁnitions of managers and export experience are provided in Section 3.1.




















































































Year t 2 Year t 1 Year t Year t+1
New Exporters Never Exporters
Difference
Notes: This Figure shows the level (left axis) and difference (right axis) of the share of managers with export experience in New and
Never exporters over the 4 years window (t  2 till t+ 1) used in the construction of our trade status categories and centered around
the year t 2 [1997,2004]. in which New exporter start exporting. The deﬁnitions of managers, export experience and ﬁrms’ export
status categories are provided in Section 3.1.






















































































Year t 2 Year t 1 Year t Year t+1
Exiting Exporters Continuing Exporters
Difference
Notes: This Figure shows the level (left axis) and difference (right axis) of the share of managers with export experience in Exiting
and Continuing exporters over the 4 years window (t 2 till t+1) used in the construction of our trade status categories and centered
around the year t 2 [1997,2004]. in which Exiting exporter quit exporting. The deﬁnitions of managers, export experience and ﬁrms’
export status categories are provided in Section 3.1.
45Figure 7: Share of Managers Hired After t-2 vs. Ratio between Managers and Workers at t-3,
Pooled Sample 1997-2004
Notes: This Figure shows the scatter plot and regression line of the ﬁrm-level ratio of managers to workers in year t   3 (X axis)
and the share of currently employed managers hired in between t   2 and t (Y axis). The regression coefﬁcient is -0.124 and, with a
standard error of 0.005, it is signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level. The R2 of the regression is 0.003. The deﬁnition of managers is
provided in Section 3.1.
Figure 8: Share of Managers with Export Experience that are Displaced, by NUTS III, 1997
and 2003
Notes: This Figure shows the spatial distribution of the variable PAME across the 28 NUTS 3 regions forming continental Portugal
for the two sample years 1997 and 2003. The variable PAME equals the ratio of the number of displaced managers with export
experience in a NUTS 3 region in year t to the number of managers with export experience in the same location-year. The deﬁnitions
of managers, export experience and displacement status are provided in Section 3.1.
46Data Appendix
Each worker in Quadros de Pessoal (QP) has a unique identiﬁer based on her social
security number. In order to minimize the risk that the same identiﬁer is assigned to two
different workers, we create a new individual identiﬁer based on the worker original
identiﬁer, her gender, year and month of birth.
All the information in QP is collected during the month of November of each year.
Worker-level variables (not available in 2001) refer to October of the same year.
Firm-level variables refer to the current calendar year (except ﬁrm total sales that refer
to the previous calendar year).
The location of the ﬁrm is measured according to the NUTS 3 regional disaggregation.
We keep only NACE rev.1 2-digits industries between 10 and 95 (excluding agriculture,
ﬁshery, other minor industries and extra-territorial activities). Results shown in the
paper refer to the manufacturing sector only (NACE 15 to 37).
In the trade dataset, we restrict the sample to transactions registered as sales as opposed
to returns, transfers of goods without transfer of ownership, and work done.
In the following, we report further details about the deﬁnitions of some key variables.
Hourly Wage Computed adding base and overtime wages plus regular beneﬁts (at
the month-level) and dividing by the number of regular and overtime hours worked in
the reference week multiplied by 4.¯ 3. We apply a trimming of the top and bottom 0.5
per cent.
Hiring Date The year the worker was hired in the ﬁrm is a variable that is directly
registered in QP. Since there are few instances when the hiring date changes from year
to year for the same worker-ﬁrm spell, we create a robust version of the hiring date
computed using the mode for each ﬁrm-worker spell. If there is a tie, we take the
minimum year in the spell.
Tenure This variable is measured as the difference between the current year and the
hiring date.
Foreign Ownership A ﬁrm is deﬁned as foreign-owned if 50 percent or more of its
equity is owned by a non-resident.
Firm Age Firm age at time t is equal to the difference between t and the year (minus one)
the ﬁrm was created. The year the ﬁrm was created is replaced to missing whenever it is
earlier than 1600.
Firm Size Firm size at time t is equal to the (log) number of all workers employed by
the ﬁrm as resulting from the ﬁrm record.
Firm Apparent Labor Productivity Firm apparent labor productivity at time t is equal
to the (log) ratio between total sales (sales in the domestic market plus exports) and the
47number of all workers employed by the ﬁrm as resulting from the ﬁrm record.
Firm Trade Status Firm’s trade status at time t is determined using the trade dataset
and according to the deﬁnitions provide in Section 3.1.
Export Experience A worker in year t has “export experience” if she worked, in the
past, in a different ﬁrm that had a positive amount of exports. Note that (i) experience
can be acquired in a non-manufacturing ﬁrm as we focus on manufacturing only when
performing estimations; (ii) since worker-level variables are not available for 2001 and,
in few instances, workers are included in QP with a lag, we use the hiring date data
variable in order to retrieve the ﬁrm afﬁliation of the worker in the past whenever this is
missing.
Firm Closure and Displaced Workers A ﬁrm is deﬁned as closing in year t when the
ﬁrm is included in QP in year t but not in any of the three subsequent years. In order to
distinguish ﬁrms’ closures from mergers & acquisitions we follow Carneiro and Portugal
(2006) by imposing the worker hiring year in the new ﬁrm not to be smaller than the
year of closure of the previous employer. As far as the ﬁrm closure variable is concerned
we assume that no ﬁrm is in QP in 2001. More precisely, a worker whose ﬁrm closes in
2000 and that appears in QP in 2002 in a (different) ﬁrm is classiﬁed as displaced even if
we do not observe workers in 2001.
48Tables Appendix
Table 8: Classiﬁcation of Workers According to Hierarchical Levels
Level Tasks Skills
1. Top executives (top management) Deﬁnition of the ﬁrm general policy
or consulting on the organization of
the ﬁrm; strategic planning; creation or
adaptation of technical, scientiﬁc and
administrative methods or processes
Knowledge of management and coordi-
nation of ﬁrms’ fundamental activities;
knowledge of management and coordi-
nation of the fundamental activities in
the ﬁeld to which the individual is as-
signed and that requires the study and
research of high responsibility and tech-
nical level problems
2. Intermediary executives (middle management) Organization and adaptation of the
guidelines established by the superiors
and directly linked with the executive
work
Technical and professional qualiﬁca-
tionsdirectedto executive, research, and
management work
3. Supervisors, team leaders Orientation of teams, as directed by the




4. Higher-skilled professionals Tasks requiring a high technical value
and deﬁned in general terms by the su-
periors
Complete professional qualiﬁcation
with a specialization adding to
theoretical and applied knowledge
5. Skilled professionals Complex or delicate tasks, usually not
repetitive, and deﬁned by the superiors
Complete professional qualiﬁcation im-
plying theoretical and applied knowl-
edge
6. Semi-skilled professionals Well deﬁned tasks, mainly manual or
mechanical (no intellectual work) with
low complexity, usually routine and
sometimes repetitive
Professional qualiﬁcation in a limited
ﬁeld or practical and elementary profes-
sional knowledge
7. Non-skilled professionals Simple tasks and totally determined Practical knowledge and easily acquired
in a short time
8. Apprentices, interns, trainees Apprenticeship
Notes: Hierarchical levels deﬁned according to Decreto Lei 121/78 of July 2nd (Lima and Pereira (2003)).
49Table 9: Wage Regression - Interactions - Core Covariates
Covariates Interactions Interactions
Worker FE Worker-Trade Status FE
Export Exp. (0/1) -0.011a -0.015
(0.003) (0.015)
Manag. X Export Exp. (0/1) 0.055a 0.031c
(0.008) (0.017)
Export Exp. X New (0/1) -0.025a 0.022
(0.003) (0.026)
Export Exp. X Cont. Exporter (0/1) -0.009a -0.009
(0.003) (0.015)
Export Exp. X Exit. Exporter (0/1) -0.021a -0.061
(0.005) (0.139)
Export Exp. X Other Exporter (0/1) -0.006a -0.018
(0.002) (0.015)
Manag. X Export Exp. X New (0/1) 0.026a -0.046
(0.010) (0.085)
Manag. X Export Exp. X Cont. (0/1) 0.026a 0.053a
(0.008) (0.018)
Manag. X Export Exp. X Exit. (0/1) 0.026c 0.118
(0.016) (0.091)
Manag. X Export Exp. X Other (0/1) 0.014c 0.026
(0.008) (0.018)
Manag. X New (0/1) -0.002 0.044
(0.004) (0.075)
Manag. X Cont. Exporter (0/1) 0.013a -0.011b
(0.003) (0.005)
Manag. X Exit. Exporter (0/1) -0.002 -0.061
(0.005) (0.042)






Number of nss 1,050,252
Number of nss_ts 1,395,980
Notes: This Table contains the coefﬁcients value and standard deviation of the interactions between
experience, manager, and trade status coming from the within estimation of the mincerian wage
equation (1). Other covariates’ estimates and standard deviations are reported in Table 10. The
dependent variable is a worker log hourly wage in euros as deﬁned in details in the Data Appendix.
Both results based on worker ﬁxed effects and "worker-ﬁrm trade status" ﬁxed effects are provided.
Both speciﬁcations include a set of NUTS 3 region dummies, NACE 2-digits industry dummies and
year dummies. a, b, and c mean, respectively, that a coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly different from zero at
the 1, 5, and 10% conﬁdence level. Standard errors are obtained with worker-level clustering.
50Table 10: Wage Regression - All - Controls
Covariates Baseline Baseline Time Breakdown Time Breakdown Interactions Interactions
Worker FE Worker- Worker FE Worker- Worker FE Worker-
Trade Status FE Trade Status FE Trade Status FE
Age (Years) 0.070a 0.071a 0.070a 0.071a 0.070a 0.071a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age Squared (Years) -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education (Years) 0.003a 0.003a 0.003a 0.003a 0.003a 0.003a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure (Years) 0.001a 0.000c 0.001a 0.000c 0.001a 0.000b
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Manager (0/1) 0.033a 0.034a 0.035a 0.036a 0.024a 0.040a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Blue Collar (0/1) -0.045a -0.038a -0.045a -0.038a -0.045a -0.038a
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Other Collar (0/1) -0.107a -0.098a -0.107a -0.098a -0.107a -0.098a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
2nd Firm (or later) 0.005b 0.007b 0.004 0.004 0.005b 0.007b
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
3rd Firm (or later) 0.020a 0.026a 0.015a 0.019a 0.020a 0.026a
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
4th Firm (or later) 0.008 -0.003 0.002 -0.012 0.009 -0.003
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010)
5th Firm (or later) 0.028 -0.011 0.025 -0.014 0.028 -0.011
(0.026) (0.035) (0.026) (0.035) (0.026) (0.035)
6th Firm (or later) -0.125 -0.269c -0.13 -0.270c -0.126 -0.269c
(0.090) (0.155) (0.091) (0.155) (0.091) (0.155)
Firm Size (log) 0.029a 0.029a 0.029a 0.029a 0.029a 0.029a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Apparent Labor Productivity (log) 0.004a 0.001a 0.004a 0.001a 0.004a 0.001a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Exports PT (log) 0.107a 0.107a 0.107a 0.107a 0.107a 0.107a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Age (log) 0.003a 0.005a 0.003a 0.005a 0.003a 0.005a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Foreign Ownership (0/1) 0.018a 0.011a 0.018a 0.011a 0.018a 0.012a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
New Exporter (0/1) 0.006a 0.007a 0.010a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Continuing Exporter (0/1) -0.001 -0.001 -0.002c
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Exiting Exporter (0/1) -0.002c -0.002 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Other Exporter (0/1) 0.004a 0.004a 0.004a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Size of Prev. Firm (0/1) 0.012b 0.002 0.015a 0.003 0.011b 0.002
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
App. Prod. of Prev. Firm (0/1) -0.035a -0.022 -0.034a -0.017 -0.035a -0.015
(0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013)
Size of Previous Firm (log) 0.001b 0.004a 0.001c 0.004a 0.001b 0.004a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
App. Prod. of Previous Firm (log) 0.003a 0.001 0.002a 0.001 0.003a 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Avg. Managers’ Age -0.001a -0.001a -0.001a -0.001a -0.001a -0.001a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Age 0.000 -0.000c 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000c
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Avg. Managers’ Education -0.000a -0.001a -0.000a -0.001a -0.000a -0.001a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Education 0.001a 0.001a 0.001a 0.001a 0.001a 0.001a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -2.353a -2.316a -2.350a -2.307a -2.349a -2.311a
(0.099) (0.087) (0.099) (0.087) (0.098) (0.087)
Observations 2,895,888 2,895,888 2,895,888 2,895,888 2,895,888 2,895,888
R2 0.366 0.352 0.367 0.353 0.366 0.352
Number of nss 1,050,252 1,050,252 1,050,252
Number of nss_ts 1,395,980 1,395,980 1,395,980
Notes: This Table contains the coefﬁcients value and standard deviation of the controls used in the within estimation of the mincerian wage equation (1). The dependent variable is a worker
log hourly wage in euros as deﬁned in details in the Data Appendix. Both results based on worker ﬁxed effects and "worker-ﬁrm trade status" ﬁxed effects are provided for each of the three
speciﬁcations considered: baseline, time-breakdown, and interactions. All speciﬁcations include a set of NUTS 3 region dummies, NACE 2-digits industry dummies and year dummies. a, b,
and c mean, respectively, that a coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10% conﬁdence level. Standard errors are obtained with worker-level clustering.
51Table 11: Trade Status Regressions Controls - OLS
Covariates
New vs. Never Exiting vs. Continuing
Baseline Size Time Baseline Size Time
& Productivity Breakdown & Productivity Breakdown
Firm Age (log) -0.004b -0.003b -0.004b 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Foreign Ownership (0/1) 0.083a 0.082a 0.083a 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Avg. Managers’ Age -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Age 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Avg. Managers’ Education 0.008a 0.007a 0.008a -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Education 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004c 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Avg. FE Managers -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Std. Dev. FE Managers 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Notes: This Table contains the coefﬁcients value and standard deviation of the controls used in the OLS estimations of the trade status equation (2).The ﬁrst three
columns display estimations referring to the comparison of New vs Never exporters, while the last three columns refer to the comparison of Exiting vs Continuing
exporters. The dependent variable is a binary indicator taking value one whenever a ﬁrm is a New (Exiting) exporter and zero otherwise. The unconditional probability
of being a New (Exiting) exporter is 0.051 (0.035). The key variable in our analysis is the share of managers with export experience currently employed by the ﬁrm
: Manag. w/Export Exp. (Share). In columns 1 and 4 we consider this variable alone, while in columns 2 and 5 (3 and 6) we consider it interaction with ﬁrm size
and productivity (its time breakdown). All covariates, except dummies, have been divided by their respective standard deviation in order to deliver a comparable
metric in terms of the variation of the dependent variable which is explained by a one standard deviation change in the dependent variable. All speciﬁcations include
a set of NACE 2-digits industry dummies, NUTS 3-digit region dummies, and year dummies. Standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01,
bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
Table 12: Trade Status Regressions Controls - Instrumental Variables
Covariates
New vs. Never Exiting vs. Continuing
Baseline Size Time Baseline Size Time
& Productivity Breakdown & Productivity Breakdown
Firm Age (log) 0.007b 0.003 0.001 0.007 0.001 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.011) (0.006) (0.004)
Foreign Ownership (0/1) 0.052a 0.056a 0.061a 0.004 0.003 -0.009
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Avg. Managers’ Age -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 0.004 0.004 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Age 0.005c 0.004 0.005 -0.003 -0.003 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Avg. Managers’ Education 0.001 0.004 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Education 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.004c 0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Avg. FE Managers -0.006b -0.002 -0.006c 0.003 0.003 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Std. Dev. FE Managers -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Notes: This Table contains the coefﬁcients value and standard deviation of the controls used in the IV estimations of the trade status equation (2).The ﬁrst three
columns display estimations referring to the comparison of New vs Never exporters, while the last three columns refer to the comparison of Exiting vs Continuing
exporters. The dependent variable is a binary indicator taking value one whenever a ﬁrm is a New (Exiting) exporter and zero otherwise. The unconditional probability
of being a New (Exiting) exporter is 0.046 (0.035). The key variable in our analysis is the share of managers with export experience currently employed by the ﬁrm
: Manag. w/Export Exp. (Share). In columns 1 and 4 we consider this variable alone, while in columns 2 and 5 (3 and 6) we consider it interaction with ﬁrm size
and productivity (its time breakdown). All covariates, except dummies, have been divided by their respective standard deviation in order to deliver a comparable
metric in terms of the variation of the dependent variable which is explained by a one standard deviation change in the dependent variable. All speciﬁcations include
a set of NACE 2-digits industry dummies, NUTS 3-digit region dummies, and year dummies. Standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01,
bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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